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I. INTRODUCTION
By longstanding tradition, local phone companies are required to sell
their services to customers at roughly comparable prices.1 This so-called
“universal service” obligation is intended to ensure that people who live in
rural and residential areas (which are expensive to serve) can buy phone
service on terms similar to those offered to urban or business customers
(which are cheaper to serve).2 Under universal service obligations, then,
retail pricing is typically averaged across a variety of customers or
geographic areas.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act” or “1996
Act”),3 however, introduced a new wrinkle into the realm of
telecommunications pricing. By law, local telephone companies, known as
incumbent local exchange companies (“ILECs”), would be forced to lease
virtually all of their equipment and facilities to their competitors, the idea
being that the competitors could then offer a competitive product to the
consumers.4 The pricing terms of such leases are to be set by state public
utility commissions, who must calculate the theoretical cost of constructing
a new network. This system of cost-based pricing is known as TELRIC,
which stands for “total element long-run incremental cost.”5
While this idea may have had merit standing alone,6 the combination
of universal service obligations and cost-based wholesale leasing is utterly
perverse. It simply makes no sense to require the same company to sell its
1. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 252(d) (2000).
4. See id.
5. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2002); Id. § 51.505(a)-(b); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition
Order].
6. Some economists would dispute that conclusion, however. A noted scholar
observed long ago, “[T]he very nature of a monopolistic public utility is such as to preclude
an attempt to make the emulation of competition very close.” JAMES C. BONBRIGHT,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961), quoted in Kenneth Nowotny, The Economics
of Public Utility Regulation: An Overview, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 9, 19 (Kenneth Nowotny et al. eds., 1989). Alfred Kahn
similarly notes that “the notion of requiring a firm to share economies ‘equally’ with . . .
outsiders contradicts the essential nature of a firm.” ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS
WOULD DESTROY, OR HOW NOT TO DEREGULATE 19 (2001) [hereinafter KAHN, WHOM THE
GODS WOULD DESTROY].
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wholesale access at cost, while it must still sell its retail services to all
customers at an average price that completely ignores cost.7 As the
California energy crisis of 2001 showed in painful detail, it is absolutely
unworkable to attempt to keep below-cost retail regulation in place while
creating a system of at-cost wholesale prices.8 The predictable result in
California was to “drive the utilities to the point of insolvency.”9 Some
analysts predict a similarly gloomy future for the telecom industry.10
The following analogy might be instructive: Imagine that Ford had
historically been seen as a monopoly provider of automobiles. Imagine
further that because of a desire for fairness to all customers, the
government had traditionally required Ford to personally deliver cars to all
customers’ homes at roughly the same price, even if some customers were
located right next door to a dealership while others lived a hundred miles
from any dealership. This system might be workable as long as Ford was
able to use its monopoly power to charge all customers a similar price, such
that the next-door customers were essentially subsidizing the far-off
customers’ delivery.

7. See AT&T Comm. of the Pac. N.W., Inc. v. U.S. West Comm., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d
861, 865 (D. Ore. 1998) (“Although the Act contemplates a competitive world in which
services are sold on the basis of cost alone, the reality is that we don’t yet have a true free
market. Rather, we have a hybrid system in which Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
(“CLECs”) are free to compete but Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”) . . . are
still subject to extensive restrictions.”).
8. As Judge Richard Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in his
analysis of deregulation, California attempted to reduce and then cap retail rates, even while
requiring utilities to buy wholesale power on a real-time spot market that more closely
tracked actual costs. Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 174-75 (2001). The result was a system that everyone
agrees was disastrous, resulting in blackouts and bankruptcies of major companies. Joseph
P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 439-40 (2002).
Even if one assumes that wholesalers were engaged in price gouging in California, the point
still remains that it is irrational to have one regulatory approach for retail rates and a
completely opposite regulatory approach for wholesale rates.
9. PAUL L. JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY CRISIS 51 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8442, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8442.
10. See, e.g., Simon Romero, At Telecom Research Firm, the Forecast is Never Sunny,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at C8 (“‘Very few seem to understand that we are on the edge of
a financial and business precipice,’ Probe [Research] said in the January report. ‘If this bear
market is prolonged, we fully expect at least one RBOC [regional Bell operating company]
to fail. The collapse, like that of the volcano Krakatoa, will be heard around the world, and
reverberations will be felt for years.’”).
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But then suppose that the government, in an effort to undermine
Ford’s historic monopoly, ordered Ford to sell all of its automobiles at
wholesale, cost-based prices to Chevrolet, who could then relabel the
automobiles and resell them immediately. The result would be easy to
predict: Chevrolet would buy Ford’s autos at the cheap, wholesale prices,
and would then target the next-door customers who had historically been
relatively overcharged. This, in turn, would undermine Ford’s ability to
comply with the obligation to deliver automobiles at average prices to rural
customers far away from the dealership.
Current telecommunications regulation is roughly equivalent to this
hypothetical I have sketched. Local phone companies are being forced
simultaneously to provide service at averaged prices to expensive rural
customers and to sell wholesale access at cost to their competitors, who can
then resell phone service to urban and business customers. This in turn
undermines the local phone companies’ ability to comply with universal
service obligations.
To put things more clearly, here is a simplified model of
telecommunications service. Imagine that a state consists of 50,000 urban
business customers, 50,000 suburban residential customers, and 10,000
rural customers, all of whom purchase exactly the same service package.
The business customers cost $20 per month to serve, the suburban
customers cost $40 per month to serve, and the rural customers cost $100
per month to serve. Thus, the total cost of service is $4 million per month.
As the local phone company is required to charge all customers equal
prices for the same service, the price charged to each customer is $36.36
per month (4 million divided by 110,000). Thus, the business customers
pay an extra $16.36 per month, the residential customers get a bargain in
the amount of $3.64 per month, and the rural customers benefit by $63.64
per month.
The viability of this universal service pricing system depends on
being able to charge the urban business customers more and the rural
customers less. But then enters the 1996 Act, with the requirement that the
local phone companies lease their lines and equipment to competitors at
cost. Thus, if a competitor comes to the local exchange company and
announces that it has signed up all 50,000 urban business customers at
some retail price under $36.36 per month, the incumbent must lease 50,000
lines to the competitor at the actual cost of $20 per month. This then leaves
the incumbent serving all the 50,000 suburban customers and the 10,000
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rural customers at a per-customer loss of $3.64 and $63.64 per month,
respectively. (Obviously, the competitors will have little interest in leasing
rural lines at the actual cost of $100 per month and then selling retail
service at $36.36.)
Clearly, this is a highly stylized and simplified model because
conditions are much more complicated in the real world. Still, this model
shows just where the problem lies for the incumbents. On one hand, they
are required by law to serve rural customers at prices that do not cover the
costs of service. On the other hand, they are now being required to lease
lines to competitors at actual cost, who then skim off the most profitable
urban business customers11 who made the entire system of universal service
work in the first place.12 As telecom lawyer and scholar Peter Huber
recently wrote, “Ordinarily, imperfections in the price-regulating
machinery tend to cancel each other out; here, competitors buy wholesale
where wholesale is cheaper than retail, and consumers buy retail where
retail is cheaper than wholesale. One way or another, incumbent companies
end up with sharply lower revenues.”13
But in fact, the problem is even worse than I have suggested thus far.
In most states, regulators base retail rates on “value-of-service”
calculations, by which rates are actually higher in dense urban areas on the
theory that service is more valuable in areas where there are many people
to whom one can make local calls.14 According to one estimate, businesses
are charged at rates of up to four times those charged for the same service
in residential areas.15 In Rosston and Wimmer’s recent analysis of
11. See, e.g., THOMAS W. BONNETT, TELEWARS IN THE STATES: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ISSUES IN A NEW ERA OF COMPETITION 142 (1996); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323,
1347 (1998).
12. Again, one might note that the federal government and several states have set up
Universal Service Funds (“USFs”) that supposedly reimburse carriers for serving high-cost
customers. As I argue, however, these USFs are presently not nearly precise and targeted
enough to effectively solve the problem. See infra Part III.B.
13. Peter W. Huber, Telecom Undone—A Cautionary Tale, COMMENTARY, Jan. 2003 at
34, 38.
14. See GREGORY L. ROSSTON & BRADLEY S. WIMMER, LOCAL TELEPHONE RATE
STRUCTURES: BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACT 4-5 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Research,
Discussion Paper No. 01-30, (2002)), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/
01-30.pdf [hereinafter ROSSTON & WIMMER, LOCAL RATE STRUCTURES].
15. Livia Solange West, Deregulating Telecommunications: The Conflict Between
Competition and Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 170 nn.59-60 (1996). See also

BUCK-FINAL

6

12/22/2003 6:48 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

nationwide data, they found that “residential rates are equal to less than
one-half the rate paid by business users, holding costs constant,”16 and even
that “rates across states are inversely related to costs.”17 To go back to my
analogy, this would be as if state law required Ford to charge twice as
much for a cross-town delivery as for a cross-country delivery. The
incentive for distorted competitive entry would be obvious.
There is little hope for legislative or regulatory relief from this
dilemma. Changing the retail rate system is generally thought to be a
political nonstarter.18 As Robert Saunders pointed out in a recent essay,
raising residential rates to market prices
is not an option any company can lobby for without engendering a
massive backlash.
Although almost any industry analyst would tell you that Aunt Tilly
is simply not paying enough for the telephone services she currently
enjoys, it’s nigh impossible to convince a lawmaker or regulator of
this. No ratepayer wants to pay more, and the PSCs are beholden to
powerful folks who listen when large lobbies like the AARP speak.19

David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: Roadblocks
on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 127-28 (1994)
(describing value-of-service pricing) [hereinafter Kaserman & Mayo].
16. ROSSTON & WIMMER, LOCAL RATE STRUCTURES, supra note 14, at 4. See also id. at
9, 16 (noting that if costs are held constant, the average residential rate is about forty-five
percent of the business rate).
17. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
18. As Alfred Kahn has said, “However much they may be required for economic
efficiency, justified by the non-traffic sensitivity of access costs, and compelled by the
pressures of competition, increases in the basic monthly rate are political poison.” Alfred E.
Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 153 (1984).
But see Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 15, at 122 (“Cross-subsidies do not promote
universal service, and the political costs of removing them are not as great as some parties
have led regulators to believe.”).
19. Robert A. Saunders, UNE-P: Regulating Toward the End of the Industry?,
TELEPHONY ONLINE, at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom_unep_regulating_toward/
(Sept. 13, 2002). On the other hand, it might be possible to argue that universal service retail
pricing fails to provide much benefit to rural users, and that cost-based retail rates would be
a net benefit. Some economists have suggested, somewhat surprisingly, that this would be
particularly true in more rural states. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD
WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE? 115-123 (2000) [hereinafter CRANDALL
& WAVERMAN]. Nevertheless, that is an issue beyond the scope of this paper.
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Milton Mueller agrees, saying that in the debate over costs,
the ultimate trump card is the level of local telephone rates. If basic
service rates go up, the FCC will look bad and the new law will appear
to the public to be a failure. Thus, the commission’s temptation to
maintain implicit universal service subsidies or to structure the subsidy
program in a way that prevents a cost-based rebalancing of telephone
rates is probably irresistible.20

Economists confirm that “regulators are mostly influenced by political
considerations,” primarily “cross subsidization to politically influential user
groups.”21
In order to combat the obvious irrationality of this system, local
phone companies may find it necessary to file lawsuits alleging a violation
of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. Such a suit would
claim that the current combination of an averaged retail rate structure and
cost-based UNE prices creates a “confiscatory” rate that effectively “takes”
their property without just compensation.22 Though modern courts are not
always in agreement on how to apply the “confiscatory rate” doctrine under
the Takings Clause, all agree that the Constitution requires that a

20. Milton Mueller, Universal Service and the Telecommunications Act: Myth Made
Law, 40 COMMUNICATIONS 39, 46-47 (1997).
21. BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING 251
(1991); see also Gerald R. Faulhaber, Voting on Prices: The Political Economy of
Regulation, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE (Gregory L. Rosston & David
Waterman eds., 1997), available at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~faulhabe/
VotePriceNew.pdf (arguing that pricing set by voter-controlled regulators can actually yield
lower total surplus than unregulated monopoly pricing); Robert W. Crandall, Telephone
Subsidies, Income Redistribution, and Consumer Welfare, in A COMMUNICATIONS
CORNUCOPIA: MARKLE FOUNDATION ESSAYS ON INFORMATION POLICY 400 (Roger G. Noll &
Monroe E. Price eds., 1998).
For more on the economic theory of regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Taxation
by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976); Stephen G. Donald &
David E. M. Sappington, Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S.
Telecommunications Industry, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 237 (1995); David L.
Kaserman et al., The Political Economy of Deregulation: The Case of Intrastate Long
Distance, 5 J. REG. ECON. 49 (1993).
22. See infra Part V.B.
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company’s investors be able to achieve a rate of return reasonably
comparable to rates achieved by similar firms with similar levels of risk.23
As a famous scholar once commented, “The Supreme Power who
conceived gravity, supply and demand, and the double helix must have
been absorbed elsewhere when public utility regulation was invented.”24
The recent history of telecommunications regulation does not give much
cause for hope, as it attempts to combine two inherently contradictory
requirements—universal service retail pricing and cost-based UNE pricing.
Because a federal judge would hopefully be isolated from the conflicting
political pressures that affect the rationality of decisions by legislators and
bureaucrats, a takings lawsuit may well be the most effective way to
challenge this confiscatory set of regulations.

II. TELRIC
A. Unbundling under Federal Law
The Telecom Act of 1996 requires, in brief, that incumbent local
exchange companies (“ILECs”) lease their facilities (i.e., their equipment
and resources) to competitive local exchange companies (“CLECs”).25 The
facilities that ILECs have to lease typically include just about anything that
ILECs have—the copper loops that run out to people’s houses, the switches
that direct calls, the transport lines that carry large volumes of calls from
one switch to another, and so forth. When the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) orders a particular facility to be leased, that facility is
said to have been “unbundled,” and all such facilities are collectively called
“unbundled network elements,” or UNEs.26

23. Id.
24. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 537
(1st ed. 1970), quoted in GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE 20 (1994).
25. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (2000).
26. States typically require the leasing of UNEs as well. Texas law, for example,
requires that ILECs unbundle at a minimum to the extent that FCC regulation requires. TEX.
UTIL. CODE ANN. § 60.021 (Vernon 1998). Texas law also purports to authorize the Public
Utility Commission to adopt additional unbundling requirements. Id. § 60.022(a). The
question of federal preemption is yet to be settled with regard to such requirements.
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Congress directed the FCC to order unbundling wherever the
competitors would be “impaired” without access to the ILECs’ facilities.27
The FCC’s first major attempt to impose massive unbundling28 was
substantially reversed by the Eighth Circuit in 1997.29 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the Commission’s definition of the “necessary”
and “impair” standards of § 251(d)(2) was improper, cautioning the
Commission not to “blind itself to the availability of elements outside the
incumbent’s network,” including self-provisioning and leasing from other
providers.30 Another problem was that the Commission viewed any
increase in the competitor’s cost as “impairment.” Said the Court, “if
Congress had wanted to give blanket access to incumbents’ networks, . . .
[i]t would simply have said (as the Commission in effect has) that whatever
requested element can be provided must be provided.”31
In the UNE Remand Order,32 the Commission revised its definition of
“impair” so as to require unbundling only if, “taking into consideration the
availability of alternative elements outside the incumbent’s network,
including self-provisioning by a requesting carrier or acquiring an
alternative from a third-party supplier, lack of access to that element
materially diminishes a requesting carrier’s ability to provide the services it
seeks to offer.”33 The Commission also held that under the “impair”
standard, it could consider other factors, including whether unbundling
would promote “rapid introduction of competition in all markets,” promote
“facilities-based competition, investment, and innovation,” reduce
regulatory obligations, promote certainty in the market, and result in
administrative practicality.34
The elements unbundled by the FCC in that 1999 order included local
loops,35 subloops,36 Network Interface Devices (“NIDs”),37 circuit
27. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).
28. Local Competition Order, supra note 5.
29. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
30. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999).
31. Id. at 390.
32. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 888 (1999).
33. Id. para. 51.
34. Id. paras. 107-16.
35. Local loops were defined as “all features, functions, and capabilities of the
transmission facilities, including dark fiber and attached electronics (except those used for
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switching,38 packet switching,39 dedicated transport,40 shared transport,41
signaling networks and call-related databases,42 and operations support
systems (“OSS”).43 Subsequently, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the FCC yet again, holding that the agency had failed
to provide some sort of limiting standard as the Supreme Court had
required.44

the provision of advanced services, such as DSLAMs owned by the incumbent LEC,
between an incumbent LEC’s central office and the loop demarcation point at the customer
premises.” Id. para. 167. The Commission also required that incumbent LECs “condition”
loops to allow CLECs to offer advanced services. Id. para. 172. Conditioning, for these
purposes, means removing devices such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, range extenders,
etc., that improve voice transmission but may decrease a loop’s advanced services
capabilities. Id.
36. For example, those “portions of the loop that can be accessed at terminals in the
incumbent’s outside plant.” Id. para. 206. Points of access might include the pole near the
customer’s premises, the network interface device (“NID”), or the feeder distribution
interface (where the trunk line from the central office interfaces with the distribution line to
the subscribers). Id.
37. These include “all features, functions, and capabilities of the facilities used to
connect the loop distribution plant to the customer premises wiring, regardless of the
particular design of the NID mechanism.” Id. para. 233.
38. This is defined as “the basic function of connecting lines and trunks,” including “all
the features, functions and capabilities of the switch.” Id. para. 244.
39. This is defined as switching that routes “individual data units based on address or
other routing information.” Id. para. 302.
40. This is defined as “facilities dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that
provide telecommunications between wire centers owned by incumbent LECs or requesting
telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by incumbent LECs or requesting
telecommunications carriers.” Id. para. 322. The Commission expanded this traditional
definition so as to include all high capacity transmission facilities, including DS1 through
OC192, as well as dark fiber. Id. paras. 323, 325.
41. This is defined as “transmission facilities shared by more than one carrier, including
the incumbent LEC, between end office switches, between end office switches and tandem
switches, and between tandem switches in the incumbent LEC’s network.” Id. para. 370.
42. Signaling networks include signaling transfer points, to which each local switch
must be connected. Id. paras. 384-86. Call-related databases are “used in signaling networks
for billing and collection or the transmission, routing, or other provision of
telecommunications service.” Id. para. 403. The databases specifically unbundled include
the calling name database, the 911 database, the toll-free calling database, and several other
databases. Id. para. 410.
43. The OSS consists of “pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair,
and billing functions supported by an incumbent LEC’s databases and information.” Id.
para. 425.
44. United States Telecomm Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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The FCC extensively reviewed all its unbundling regulations in its
Triennial Review rulemaking,45 in which the most significant development
was that the FCC charged state commissions with making factual findings
regarding the competitive “impairment” as to switches (both business and
mass-market) and certain types of transport and loops.46 This means that
state commissions will play a larger role in the future in determining the
exact content of unbundling obligations.
In any event, state commissions already play an enormous role in this
process by setting the TELRIC prices for the unbundled elements. This role
is, in truth, far more important than the decision as to which elements will
be unbundled in the first place. The reason for this is straightforward. If the
prices set by a state commission are too high, it will not matter how many
elements are “unbundled” because the competitive local exchange carriers
(“CLECs”) will be unwilling to purchase them anyway; rather, they will
simply self-provide or else leave the competitive market altogether. On the
other hand, if a state commission sets prices too low (which appears more
likely in today’s regulatory environment), the CLECs will purchase UNEs
too often and in too many places, resulting in underprovision of
competitive deployment. How state commissions set the TELRIC prices,
then, may have more effect on the ultimate unbundling arrangements than
anything else.
This, in turn, is why it is so important to ensure that TELRIC prices
do not come into direct conflict with other pricing systems that are
simultaneously imposed upon the ILECs. But before reaching that point, it
is necessary to define TELRIC in fuller detail.

B. The Definition of TELRIC
The place to begin in defining TELRIC is with the regulation itself,47
and the FCC’s initial Report and Order setting forth TELRIC.48 The
regulation defines “forward-looking economic cost of an element” as the
sum of “[t]he total element long-run incremental cost of the element,”
45. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch.
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147 (Aug. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2003/db0821/FCC-03-36A1.pdf.
46. See id. para. 7 (executive summary).
47. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2002).
48. Local Competition Order, supra note 5.
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(“TELRIC”) and “[a] reasonable allocation of forward-looking common
costs.”49 TELRIC in turn is defined as “the forward-looking cost over the
long run of the total quantity of the facilities and functions that are directly
attributable to, or reasonably identifiable as incremental to, such element,
calculated taking as a given the incumbent LEC’s provision of other
elements.”50 “Long run” means that the cost must be measured by reference
to “a period long enough so that all of a firm’s costs become variable or
avoidable.”51
The term “forward-looking” rules out any consideration of embedded
(or historic) costs, i.e., costs that were incurred in the past when the ILEC
set up the facility or element in question.52 In one case, a district court
approvingly cited a party’s distinction:
The forward-looking approach is premised on the fact that the cost of
providing facilities today is their replacement cost—the true economic
cost that constrains rates in competitive markets—not what was spent
in the past. The historic cost approach, by contrast, looks to the
company’s accounting books and is based on the level of expenditures
(less depreciation).53

Controversially, the FCC requires an assumption of a maximally
efficient network: In calculating “incremental cost,” one must assume the
“most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the
lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the
incumbent LEC’s wire centers.”54 What this means, in short, is that when a
CLEC buys access to the copper loop that runs into your house, it will (in
theory) have to pay the ILEC merely what it would cost to build a brand
new copper loop with the most efficient and lowest cost equipment
available today, rather than paying to reimburse the ILEC for whatever it
spent on building the actual copper loop in question.
Costs that are “causally related” to the element are counted “if the costs are
incurred as a direct result of providing the network elements, or can be
avoided, in the long run, when the company ceases to provide them.”55
49. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a).
50. Id. § 51.505(b).
51. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 677.
52. Id. para. 675.
53. GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 528 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing
Brief for AT&T in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 12).
54. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
55. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 691.
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Moreover, one can include “costs such as certain administrative expenses,
which have traditionally been viewed as common costs, if these costs vary
with the provision of network elements.”56 But one cannot include retail,
marketing, or billing costs in the forward-looking cost of an element.57
Additionally, when calculating incremental cost, the state commission
must include the “forward-looking cost of capital”58 and “economic
depreciation rates.”59 As to these portions of “cost,” the authorized rate of
return at the federal or state level is the default assumption for TELRIC.60
If ILECs want to use another rate, they “bear the burden of demonstrating
with specificity that the business risks that they face in providing
unbundled network elements . . . would justify a different risk-adjusted cost
of capital or depreciation rate.”61 The FCC says that “properly designed
depreciation schedules should account for expected declines in the value of
capital goods.”62
The FCC elaborates by tying the cost of capital to the statutory
provision allowing a “reasonable profit” to the ILECs.63 The FCC points
out that “normal” profit, in economic terminology, refers to “the total
revenue required to cover all of the costs of a firm, including its
opportunity costs.”64 The FCC then says, “The concept of normal profit is
embodied in forward-looking costs because the forward-looking cost of
capital, i.e., the cost of obtaining debt and equity financing, is one of the
forward-looking costs of providing the network elements. This forwardlooking cost of capital is equal to a normal profit.”65
As for common costs, the FCC explains that “[f]orward-looking
common costs are economic costs efficiently incurred in providing a group
of elements or services . . . that cannot be attributed directly to individual

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(2).
59. Id. § 51.505(b)(3).
60. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 702.
61. Id.
62. Id. para. 686.
63. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2000).
64. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 699 (“Economic profit,” in turn, is
anything above a normal profit.).
65. Id. para. 700.
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elements or services.”66 An example would be the salaries of corporate
managers, which are incurred as a cost no matter what the mix of goods
and services provided. Any common costs (on a forward-looking basis) that
are common to a set of elements or services can be allocated to that set.67
For example, “shared maintenance facilities and vehicles should be
allocated only to the elements that benefit from those facilities and
vehicles.”68 Billing and marketing costs do not count as common costs.69
Note that ILECs “shall have the burden to prove the specific nature and
magnitude of these forward-looking common costs.”70
The total TELRIC price for an element (i.e., the sum of common costs
and incremental costs) cannot exceed the stand-alone costs for that
element.71 Stand-alone costs are what “would be incurred to produce a
given element if that element were provided by an efficient firm that
produced nothing but the given element.”72
I should note that several scholars have argued that TELRIC fails, in
and of itself, to compensate ILECs fairly for the use of their resources.73
Alfred Kahn, the eminent scholar of regulation, coined the term “TELRICBS,” the “BS” purportedly standing for “blank slate.”74 Many economists

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

47 C.F.R. § 51.505(c)(1) (2002).
Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 694.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 695.
47 C.F.R. § 51.505(c)(2)(i) (2002).
Id.
See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 7-8 (2000); Robert W. Crandall & Jerry A. Hausman, Competition
in U.S. Telecommunication Services: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 73, 88 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Crandall & Hausman]; Jerry Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications
Regulation, in THE NEW INVESTMENT THEORY OF REAL OPTIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 191 (James Alleman & Eli Noam eds., 1999); Mark A.
Jamison, Does Practice Follow Principle?: Applying Real Options Principles To Proxy
Costs in U.S. Telecommunications, in THE NEW INVESTMENT THEORY OF REAL OPTIONS AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 49 (James Alleman & Eli Noam
eds., 1999); Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (2000). But see David Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum, Who’s Taking Whom: Some
Comments and Evidence on the Constitutionality of TELRIC, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 239, 26768 (2000) (arguing that ILECs’ rate of return on regulated investment is high enough not to
be a taking).
74. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, supra note 6, at 3.
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instead appear to favor the efficient component pricing rule,75 on the
grounds that TELRIC understates the most appropriate economic cost of
unbundled elements. And the FCC has recently issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that indicates its intent to revise the TELRIC standard so as to
be more closely attuned to real world characteristics.76
For purposes of this article, however, it is assumed that TELRIC is
constitutionally sufficient to compensate the ILECs when considered alone.
The real issue here is whether it is constitutional to combine TELRIC
wholesale obligations with retail universal service obligations, and if not,
how ILECs may effectively remedy the situation.77

75. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN
LOCAL TELEPHONY (1994); J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY
TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 283-392 (1998); Mark Armstrong et al., The
Access Pricing Problem, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 131 (1996); William J. Baumol et al., Parity
Pricing and its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck
Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 145 (1997); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994); Alfred E.
Kahn & William Taylor, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 225
(1994).
76. See Review of the Comm’n’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network
Elements and the Resale of Serv. by Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 03-173, para. 4 (Sept. 15, 2003) (“We seek comment on an
approach that bases UNE prices on a cost inquiry that is more firmly rooted in the realworld attributes of the existing network, rather than the speculative attributes of a purely
hypothetical network.”), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
FCC-03-224A1.pdf.
77. ILECs might additionally argue that a state commission misapplied TELRIC so as
to fail to compensate an ILEC even for its forward-looking costs. Such a claim would
depend on several aspects of the commission’s ultimate decision, including how it decides
to handle depreciation, cost of capital, fill factors, and other questions.
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III. UNIVERSAL SERVICE
A. Federal and State Law
There are vast disparities between the costs of providing
telecommunications services to customers located in different geographic
areas (e.g., rural vs. urban).78 One set of scholars notes that on average,
“residential local rates have been set almost twenty-three dollars per month
below their market levels,” and that “[i]n some low-density rural areas, . . .
this difference might be much larger—several hundred dollars per
month.”79 Even the FCC acknowledges that “the cost of providing a local
loop in a rural area may be approximately one hundred times greater than
the cost in an urban area.”80 The FCC’s Joint Federal-State Board on
Universal Service observes that “if the urban cost is $20, the corresponding
rural cost that is one hundred times greater would be approximately
$2000.”81
In any normal competitive market, customers who are more expensive
to serve would be charged more, and vice versa. Consistent with decades of
regulatory policy,82 however, both federal and state law require explicitly
78. See, e.g., Emily L. Dawson, Universal Service High-Cost Subsidy Reform:
Hindering Cable-Telephony and Other Technological Advancements in Rural and Insular
Regions, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 118 (2000) (noting that “Regions that have fewer
customers over which to spread fixed costs, and other factors such as less technologically
advanced networks and rugged terrain, have inherently higher service costs.”).
79. James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty of Policy, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 849, 854 (2000) [hereinafter Alleman et al., Universal Service]. As of their writing, the
scholars observed that if “a new local carrier were to enter GTE’s serving area in Texas, and
attempt to serve all of GTE’s local residence customers, it would find that the revenue from
all services would fail to cover costs for seventy-eight percent of those customers.” Id. at
855.
80. Multi-Ass’n Group (MAG) Plan for Reg. of Interstate Servs. of Non-Price Cap
Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers and Interexch. Carriers, Second Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 00-256, 16 F.C.C.R. 19613, para.
45, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2001) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MAG Reg. Plan, Report
and Order].
81. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Recommended Decision, 17 F.C.C.R.
20716, para. 18, n.52 (2002) [hereinafter Nonrural Recommended Decision].
82. See William P. Cassidy, Jr., Universal Service in a Competitive
Telecommunications Environment: The Current State of Universal Service in the European
Union and United States, 25 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 107 (1999) (providing a good
background on universal service); Jennifer Hargroves, Adjudication of Universal Funding in
the Telecommunications Sector, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 491 (2002).
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that retail rates be virtually the same in rural and urban areas. The 1996
Act, for example, requires that “[c]onsumers in all regions of the Nation,
including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost
areas, should have access to telecommunications and information
services . . . at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for
similar services in urban areas.”83
State laws typically mirror federal law on this point. For example,
Texas requires that urban and rural retail rates be comparable,84 that rates
for nonmunicipal locations must not be more than 115% of the rates that
the same carrier charges for similar services in municipalities in the same
county,85 and that an incumbent LEC’s rates for interexchange services
must be “statewide average rates.”86 California requires that “Universal
service shall, to the extent feasible, be provided at affordable prices
regardless of linguistic, cultural, ethnic, physical, financial, and geographic
considerations.”87 Virginia goes even further, requiring “every public utility
to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities at reasonable and just
rates to any person, firm or corporation along its lines desiring same. It
shall be their duty to charge uniformly therefor all persons, corporations or
municipal corporations using such service under like conditions.”88
The result of universal service obligations is that telephone companies
have historically charged some subscribers (usually rural and/or residential)
less and some subscribers (usually urban and/or business) more.89 To

83. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2000). The same provision states that “[t]here should be
specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance
universal service.” Id. § 254(b)(5).
84. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 51.001(g) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
85. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 53.005 (Vernon 1998).
86. Id. § 53.065(a) (emphasis added).
87. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 883(d)(1) (West Supp. 2003); see also id. § 709(a) (“The
Legislature hereby finds and declares that the policies for telecommunications in California
are as follows: (a) To continue our universal service commitment by assuring the continued
affordability and widespread availability of high-quality telecommunications services to all
Californians.”) (emphasis omitted).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 (Michie Supp. 2003); see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC, §
160.02 (13) (2000) (“‘Universal service’ means a statewide rapid, efficient, communications
network with adequate, economically placed facilities to assure that a basic set of essential
telecommunications services is available to all persons in this state at affordable
prices. . . .”)
89. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & THOMAS W. HAZLETT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 18 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
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achieve the goal of comparability of rates across urban and rural areas (and
hence “universal” service), some form of cross-subsidization is necessary.
Indeed, a boilerplate definition of universal service is that it uses “cross
subsidies to keep monthly residential rates low by increasing rates for many
services (e.g., long distance calls and business rates) to levels that exceed
costs.”90
Thus, two aspects of universal service obligations are essential to
recognize. First, competitive providers will be naturally drawn to the urban
and business markets where ILECs have typically overcharged customers
so as to cross-subsidize more expensive rural customers.91 Conversely, no
competitor in its right mind would try to enter those vastly more expensive
rural markets where the customers are already being charged less than cost.
Scholars have observed that “the likelihood of entry increases with
customer density,” and that recent trends show that “entry has indeed

Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 00-9, at 18, 2000) (showing that in many American
cities, businesses are charged substantially more than residences for single lines) available
at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/hazlett/working_00_09.pdf; see also CRANDALL &
WAVERMAN, supra note 19.
90. Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC’s of Universal Service:
Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and Competition, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 1585 (1999) [hereinafter
Rosston & Wimmer, The ABC’s]. An interesting issue that this article does not address is
whether this cross-subsidization is inefficient, and hence whether universal service should
be abolished quite apart from Takings Clause concerns. Numerous scholars have observed
that cross-subsidization is “almost always antithetical to efficient pricing and ultimately to
competition.” LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S. PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD NETWORK INDUSTRIES 32
(1999). See also MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION,
INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM
179-80 (1997) (noting the contradiction between unbundling and universal service).
According to some measures, cross-subsidization in local phone service likely creates
inefficient distortions and welfare losses of $2.5 billion to $7 billion a year. See Crandall &
Hausman, supra note 73, at 78-79. See also Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 15. On the other
hand, cross-subsidization by natural monopolies is not necessarily bad; it can be the natural
result of Ramsey pricing (a second-best alternative to marginal cost pricing), in which the
customers of a multiproduct firm are charged marginal cost plus an amount proportional to
the price inelasticity of demand for the product. See, e.g., KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL
REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 116 (1991). The result might
be that some customers (those with a high price elasticity of demand) pay less than the
stand-alone cost of the product. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that universal service pricing is
not an example of Ramsey pricing.
91. See, e.g., Alleman et al., Universal Service, supra note 79, at 855; Robert M.
Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and Regulatory Models Diverge,
13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 395, 404 (2000) (“Market entrants predictably target the most
profitable and easiest-to-serve customers, typically large-volume business users in cities.”).
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largely occurred in high-density nonresidential markets.”92 The FCC itself
has recognized:
[C]ompetitors may be likely to target high-revenue business customers
in low-cost urban areas where incumbent LECs are charging rates
significantly above costs, while foregoing opportunities to serve lowerrevenue residential customers in high-cost rural areas where incumbent
LECs are charging artificially low rates because of implicit support
flows.93

As a result, “the incentives for competitive entry will necessarily be
quite distorted,”94 and the ILECs’ ability to fund their still-existing
universal service obligations may be severely undermined.
Second, universal service requires averaging of costs across
customers.95 As the FCC observed, “The urban-to-rural subsidy has been
accomplished through the explicit high cost fund mentioned above, and
through geographic rate averaging. The result of state requirements that
local telephone rates be averaged across the state is that high-density
(urban) areas, where costs are typically lower, subsidize low-density (rural)
areas.”96 Indeed, the whole point of universal service is that higher-cost
customers pay a lower retail rate than they otherwise would, while lowercost customers pay a higher retail rate.97

92. FARID GASMI ET AL., COST PROXY MODELS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 47
(2002) [hereinafter GASMI ET AL., COST PROXY MODELS].
93. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Ninth Report & Order and Eighteenth
Order on Reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 20432, para. 16, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 710 (1999)
[hereinafter Ninth Report & Order].
94. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, MANAGED COMPETITION IN U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 9
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper No. 99-1, 1999),
available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/working_99_01.pdf.
95. As one scholar notes, the most important source of universal service funding “is
geographic rate averaging: high-density urban areas, where costs are lower, underwrite the
provision of service to low-density, high-cost rural areas.” Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet
and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and
Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 214 (1999).
96. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, para.
11, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Report and Order,
May 1997]. See also Rosston & Wimmer, The ABC’s supra note 90, at 1599 (noting that
regulators rely “on geographically averaged rates to hold rates down in high-cost areas”).
97. GASMI ET AL., COST PROXY MODELS, supra note 92, at 150 (“[T]he objective of
universal service technically amounts to imposing uniform pricing across the urban and
rural areas despite the difference in the cost of serving a typical customer in those two
areas.”).

BUCK-FINAL

20

12/22/2003 6:48 AM

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

This concept of averaging, however, is absolutely contradicted by the
FCC’s concept of TELRIC rate-setting, which requires a substantial
amount of deaveraging. The FCC has concluded that “rates for . . .
unbundled elements must be geographically deaveraged”98 into at least
three cost-related rate zones.99 CLECs have often sought more extensive
deaveraging, but federal courts have generally refused to mandate
deaveraging more extensive than that ordered by the FCC.100
Geographic deaveraging of UNE prices does nothing but exacerbate
all the harmful distortions between the UNE rates and the universal service
retail rates. When UNE rates are geographically deaveraged, this means
that they will more closely mirror the actual cost of service in a particular
region, which will create a greater divergence between wholesale rates and
retail rates. This makes it all the easier for CLECs to enter precisely those
markets where there is the greatest divergence between UNE rates and
retail rates—that is, to cherry-pick profitable urban markets.101 As one
98. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 764.
99. Id. para. 765; see also 47 C.F.R. § 51.507(f) (2002) (requiring state commissions
“[to] establish different rates for elements in at least three defined geographic areas within
the state to reflect geographic cost differences”).
In defining the zones, states “may use existing density-related zone pricing plans
described in 47 C.F.R. § 69.123” or as established under state law, or if no such plan exists,
“state commissions must create a minimum of three cost-related rate zones.” 47 C.F.R. §
51.507(f)(1)-(2) (requiring state commissions to “establish different rates for elements in at
least three defined geographic areas within the state to reflect geographic cost differences”).
Turning to 47 C.F.R. § 69.123 for an example of a density-related zoning rule, one finds that
ILECs not subject to price cap regulation are allowed to establish “a reasonable number of
density pricing zones” for special access and switched transport, and that these “pricing
zones shall be designed to reasonably reflect cost-related characteristics, such as the density
of total interstate traffic in central offices located in the respective zones.” Id. §
69.123(a)(1)-(2).
100. See, e.g., U.S. West Comm., Inc. v. Jennings, 304 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2002);
AT&T Comm. S. States, Inc. v. GTE Fla., Inc., 123 F. Supp.2d 1318, 1324 (N.D. Fla.
2000); AT&T Comm. S. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 122 F. Supp.2d 1305,
1313-14 (N.D. Fla. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 268 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S.
West Comm., Inc. v. Jennings, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014 (D. Ariz. 1999); MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 40 F. Supp.2d 416, 424 (E.D. Ky. 1999); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. GTE N.W., Inc., 41 F. Supp.2d 1157, 1171 & 1171, n.9 (D. Or. 1999);
AT&T Comm. Pac. N.W., Inc. v. U.S. West Comm., Inc., 31 F. Supp.2d 861, 865 (D. Or.
1998); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. US West Comm., Inc., 31 F. Supp.2d 859, 860-61 (D. Or.
1998).
101. As one court observed:
If MCI intended to serve a full range of customers through unbundled loops, it
likely would not be arguing so strenuously for deaveraging loop prices.
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court said, “Unlike CLECs . . . , an ILEC is legally obligated to service all
customers within its territory, at the same fixed price. Consequently, MCI
and other CLECs could solicit the most profitable customers, leaving the
ILEC to service the unprofitable accounts the CLECs do not want.”102
Another court stated:
The Court is aware from the cost studies provided by BellSouth that
the expenses of providing local service varies with the density of the
population. The Court is also aware that should the PSC
geographically deaverage the cost of providing service to customers,
the possibility exists that new entrants would only purchase UNEs in
urban areas or other lowcost segments of the industry. By purchasing
UNEs in this manner, a new entrant could obtain the advantages of
serving low overhead areas immediately without dealing with the need
to subsidize the more expensive areas. The Court recognizes that
remote rural areas which are less densly populated are not terribly
attractive to new market entrants. However, their need for service at a
reasonable rate is no less important than the need in booming urban
areas. It is the opinion of this Court that the PSC’s refusal to deaverage
was an effort to prevent new entrants from seeking the lowest possible
overhead to serve the most lucrative customers. . . . Therefore, the
decision of the PSC to balance universal service goals with the purpose
of the Act by refusing to deaverage the UNE rates was lawful.103

State commissions have recognized this effect of deaveraging as well.
In Vermont, the state commission observed that where there is a zone with
“high customer density and low average loop costs,” the “UNE loop prices
in the urban zone will be significantly lower than UNE loop prices in the
rural zone.”104 The commission recognized the danger of further
deaveraging: “Following UNE price deaveraging, . . . a [CLEC] that serves
Burlington and Winooski through UNEs will have lower costs and thus a
larger potential profit margin.”105 The Vermont commission went on to
Deaveraging makes financial sense to MCI only if it intends to target primarily the
lowest-cost loops, while either (1) leaving the higher-cost loops for GTE to
service, or (2) serving those higher-cost customers via the resale route, where the
discounted price the CLEC pays to GTE may be less than GTE’s actual cost to
provide the service.
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. GTE N.W., Inc., 41 F. Supp.2d at 1171 n.9.
102. Id. at 1171.
103. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 40 F. Supp.2d at 424.
104. Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd., Investigation of Geographically Deaveraged Unbundled
Network
Prices,
Docket
No.
6318,
at
12
(2000),
available
at
http://www.state.vt.us/psb/orders/2000/files/6318ordregeographicdeaveraging.pdf.
105. Id.
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describe the problem of distorted incentives:
[R]efrain[ing] from imposing broad service obligations on CLECs
[would allow] them to “cherry pick” by serving only the most lucrative
customers or areas within a UNE zone. This violates the assumption
that universal service support should be available only to carriers that
are willing to serve costly and difficult-to-serve customers. Selecting
this option could slow the diffusion of competition in high-cost rural
areas, since CLECs will have no legal obligation and no economic
incentive to serve unattractive areas. Refraining from service
obligations also violates the assumption that underlies the calculation
of an average UNE cost for the zone: that buyers will actually purchase
some services in areas where costs are below the price as well as from
areas where costs are above the price. CLECs thus would have the
opportunity to impose above-average costs on the incumbent by
purchasing only expensive facilities at averaged prices.106

Creating such a distorted set of incentives makes it impossible to
determine whether competitive entry is, in any particular case, desirable or
not. Each additional degree of UNE price deaveraging only increases the
likelihood that a CLEC might be able to offer lower rates to a business
customer in an urban area not because it is more efficient than the ILEC,
but simply because it is the unintended beneficiary of public regulation’s
schizophrenic attempt to retain a system of high rural rates and crosssubsidies while nonetheless deaveraging UNE rates by geography.107
This is why deaveraging of UNE prices inherently contradicts the
ideal of universal service.108 Indeed, this should be obvious from the FCC’s
stated rationale for deaveraging: “deaveraged rates more closely reflect the

106. Id. at 29.
107. See Alleman et al., Universal Service, supra note 79, at 861.
108. See, e.g., TEX. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, Report on Scope of Competition in
Telecommunications Markets of Texas, at 45 (2001) (“The practice of imposing crosssubsidies is incompatible with the goal of promoting fair competition (i.e., based on real
economic costs) via the construction of new facilities by new competitors.”), available at
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/telecomm/reports/scope/2001/2001scope_tele.pdf; see also West,
supra note 15, at 159; Annegret Groebel & Rainer Schnepfleitner, Geographically Averaged
Rates in the Context of Local Loop Unbundling, Paper for the 11th Euro. Reg. Conf., 4
(Sept.
9-11,
2002),
available
at
http://www.tkc.at/web.nsf/lookuid/
f0ea5f3fe2857042c1256cf000548cc0/$file/geographicallylocalloop.pdf (“[A] deaveraged
line rental implies deaveraged tariffs, taking away from the incumbent the opportunity for
internal subsidization from low-price to high-price regions. The result is that prices rise in
rural areas until costs are recovered whereas prices fall for urban customers due to
competition.”).
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actual costs of providing interconnection and unbundled elements.”109 But
this principle is flatly contradictory to universal service, which by its very
nature requires that high-cost customers be charged rates that do not reflect
the actual costs of the services they purchase.

B. The Federal and State Universal Service Funds
1. USF Funding
All of this concern over TELRIC pricing might be ameliorated if
ILECs were fairly compensated for their provision of universal service to
all customers. And indeed, both the federal government and some state
governments have set up Universal Service Funds (“USFs”) that purport to
reimburse carriers for the expenses of serving expensive customers at
below-cost rates. Unfortunately, neither the federal USF nor prominent
state USFs succeed in fairly compensating ILECs for this obligation.
The first problem with all types of USFs is the source of funding. It is
well known to economists that the least distortionary system of subsidizing
any particular activity is usually to take the money from general revenues,
so that consumers’ patterns of consumption remain proportional.110 Neither
federal nor state USFs are funded that way. Rather, both types depend on
funding from fees paid in equal proportions by all carriers, including the
very carriers that are supposed to be subsidized by the USF in question.
Let us take a closer look at the federal high-cost universal service
programs first, focusing on two that are most relevant to the theme of this
article:111

109. Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 764 (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 19, 33 (1999); Rosston & Wimmer, The ABC’s, supra note 90 at 1612;
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 165
(1996).
111. The following federal universal service decisions apply to interstate access charges,
but are not examined in detail in this paper: MAG Reg. Plan, Report and Order, supra note
80; and Access Charge Reform, Sixth Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 96-262 and 941, 15 F.C.C.R. 12962, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 636 (2000).
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(1) The nonrural high-cost support program, which applies to nonrural
carriers.112 (Nonrural carriers are, quite simply, those who do not meet the
narrow statutory definition of an exclusively “rural” carrier.113)
(2) The rural high-cost support program, which provides support for
the loop costs faced by rural carriers.114
Both programs are generally funded by fees that apply to all carriers
based on all their interstate revenues. Under federal law, “[e]very
telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,” to
the federal fund.115 Likewise, FCC regulations that apply to all federal
universal support programs state that fees are to be based on “end-user
telecommunications revenues, and on a contribution factor determined
quarterly by the Commission.”116 The fee for the second quarter of 2003 is
approximately nine percent of all such revenues.117
State USF programs are similarly constrained by federal law, which
provides that every “telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and
nondiscriminatory basis, in a manner determined by the State to the

112. See Nonrural Recommended Decision, supra note 81.
113. The 1996 Act defined rural carriers as those who fit within one of four categories:
(1) Those who “[provide] . . . service to [a] . . . study area that does not include either . . .
any incorporated place of 10,000 inhabitants or more,” or any urban territory; (2) Those who
provide exchange service to fewer than 50,000 access lines; (3) Those who “[provide]
telephone exchange service to any local exchange carrier study area with fewer than
100,000 access lines”; or (4) Those who “[have] less than 15 percent of [their] access lines
in communities of more than 50,000.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(37) (2002).
114. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Fourteenth Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
11244, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1388 (2001) [hereinafter Rural High-Cost Order]. There are
two other rural high-cost support programs that I do not discuss in detail here: the Long
Term Support and the Local Switching Support programs. As described in the Rural HighCost Order, “LTS provides support for the interstate loop costs of rate-of-return carriers
(typically small, rural carriers) . . . , and LSS . . . is available to support a portion of the
switching costs of carriers with 50,000 or fewer lines.” Id. para. 13 n.21 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§
36.125(b), 54.301, 54.303; Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. Fourth Order on
Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96-45, R13 F.C.C.R. 5318, paras. 40-41, 56-58, 10
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1282 (1997)).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
116. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a) (2002).
117. See Universal Service Administrative Company Chart, available at
http://www.universalservice.org/download/pdf/New%20FCC%20Methodology%20Calculat
ion%20Example.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
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preservation and advancement of universal service in that State.”118
Pursuant to this provision, states generally impose fees that are based on
revenues of all carriers in the state.
Texas, for example, imposes a “statewide uniform charge payable by
each telecommunications provider that has access to the customer base.”119
According to the Commission’s rules, the USF charge “shall be payable by
all telecommunications providers,”120 based on their “monthly taxable
telecommunications receipts.”121 In California,122 the public utility
commission imposes an “All End User Surcharge,” that applies to “all
telecommunications providers” and is a “percentage of the customers’ [ ]
total expenditures on telecommunications services.”123 Similarly, Colorado
imposes a contribution fee on all intrastate revenues of all
telecommunications providers,124 and Pennsylvania employs a complicated
formula that calculates fees in proportion to intrastate revenues.125
In short, both state and federal USFs tend to be funded by
contributions that apply equally to carriers serving both low- and high-cost
customers. And if all must contribute equally, it is difficult to see how these
USFs can effectively redistribute money from low- to high-cost
118. 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (emphasis added).
119. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 56.022(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
120. P.U.C. SUBST. R. § 23.150(g)(1), available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/
telecomm/reports/txunfund.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2003). This is confirmed by the
Commission’s current website, which states that the Texas system of universal service is
funded by a 3.6% fee on “all telecommunications companies.” Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, The
Texas Universal Service Fund, at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/ocp/telephone/txunivserv.cfm
(last modified June 30, 2003) (emphasis added). The Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel
also says that the Texas USF charge is “assessed on all Texas local, long distance, pager,
wireless, and other telecommunications services.” Tex. Universal Serv. Fund,
Understanding Your Telephone Bill, at http://www.opc.state.tx.us/phoneb~1.htm (last
modified Sept. 8, 2003) (emphasis added).
121. P.U.C. SUBST. R. § 23.150(g)(2). Though the providers may recover the USF charge
through a surcharge added to customers’ bills, “the surcharge must be assessed as a
percentage of every retail customers’ bill.” Id. § 23.150(g)(5)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
122. California’s main Universal Service Order can be found here: Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion into Universal Service and to
Comply with the Mandates of Assembly Bill 3643, Decision No. 96-10-066, 1996 Cal. PUC
LEXIS 1046 (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Cal. USF Decision].
123. Id. at *436.
124. 4 CODE OF COLO. REG. §§ 723-41-7.1–723-41-7.5 (2003), available at
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/rules/723-41.pdf.
125. 52 PA. CODE § 63.165 (2001), available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/
vol31/31-26/1165.html.
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customers.126 Rather, the equal contribution requirements dilute the effect
of any cross-subsidization and therefore tend to undercompensate carriers
that serve high-cost or rural areas.

2. USF Disbursements
If a USF were to properly compensate incumbent carriers for the costs
of serving expensive areas, it would have to be structured something like
this:
1) The average cost for residential and business wire centers should
be computed.
2) All contributions to the state USF should come only from fees
leveled on service provided in wire centers (or some other configuration) in
which the cost is below the average cost for the service in question.
3) All USF funding should flow only to companies providing service
to wire centers in which the costs exceed the average residential or business
cost, and should cover any discrepancy between cost of service (including a
contribution to the firm’s joint and common costs) and the retail rates
mandated by state law.
4) No reductions in other fees or charges should be required from any
carrier receiving disbursements from the USF.
Such a system of funding and disbursement would mimic the crosssubsidization that a single ILEC was able to accomplish in the past.
Customers in low-cost, urban areas would inevitably be charged a higher
rate for service, and the funds would be used to cross-subsidize operations
in high-cost, rural areas.
The way that federal and state USF programs disburse funds is
nothing like the above. Neither type of fund appears to provide anything
resembling full compensation for those incumbent carriers who serve highcost, rural customers.

126. It is mathematically possible, of course, to design an equal percentage fee that,
given a particular balance between high- and low-cost customers, is capable of refunding all
the money paid by high-cost customers along with enough to make up the difference
between costs of service and retail rates for those high-cost customers. But no evidence
seems to exist to show that any state commission has mandated a contribution fee based on
any such calculation, and it seems a senseless exercise to require high-cost customers to pay
a fee into a program that is supposedly designed to reimburse their own carriers for serving
them.
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Regarding nonrural carriers (which are most relevant to this article),
the FCC views its task to be the equalization of funds at the state level.
That is, some states face higher telecommunications costs, on average, than
other states, and the FCC views it as its job to use the USF programs to
redistribute money from the low- to the high-cost states. As the Joint Board
said in its most recent recommended decision as to nonrural carriers, “nonrural high-cost support is designed to provide high-cost states enough
support so that their net average costs are reasonably comparable to the
national average cost.”127
Thus, the high-cost support program for nonrural carriers is likely to
distribute funds as follows:128 The FCC will continue to calculate the
overall average cost per line for nonrural carriers on a statewide basis.129 It
will then calculate the average nationwide cost per line.130 A few states will
have average per-line costs that exceed two standard deviations above the
national average—the FCC’s new requirement for funding eligibility.131
Standard statistics tells us that two standard deviations above average is
equivalent to approximately the 98th percentile. This means that only those
127. Nonrural Recommended Decision, supra note 81, para. 15.
128. The term “likely” was used because this program has had a checkered history. See
Ninth Report & Order, supra note 93, overruled by Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191,
1201-03 (10th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Report & Order was struck down chiefly on the
grounds that the FCC had failed to assure that rural and urban rates would be reasonably
comparable and had failed to present data to support its use of the 135% benchmark. Id. at
1195. The Joint Board issued a recommended decision later in 2002 that responded to the
Tenth Circuit’s concerns, see Nonrural Recommended Decision, supra note 81. The FCC
then issued an NPRM seeking comments on whether this recommended decision should be
enshrined in law. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 2932 (2003). At the time of this writing, the safest assumption seems to be that
whatever rule the FCC eventually adopts will be closely akin to the recommended decision
of October 2002. On October 16, 2003, the FCC issued a press release announcing a
forthcoming order that “largely adopts the recommendations of the Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service.” Press Release, FCC, FCC Modifies High-Cost Support
Mechanism But Maintains Current Support Levels (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-240035A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC
Press Release, Oct. 16].
129. Nonrural Recommended Decision, supra note 81, para. 24.
130. Id. para. 30, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC02J-2A1.pdf.
131. The new USF Order “[m]odifies the high-cost mechanism for non-rural carriers by
basing the cost benchmark—which is used to determine the amount of support—on two
standard deviations above the national average cost per line.” FCC Press Release, Oct. 16,
supra note 128.
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states whose average cost is higher than 97.5% of the national average will
receive high-cost support in the future. As of the first quarter of 2002, the
only states in which carriers received USF funding were Alaska, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.132
With the FCC’s new “two standard deviation” requirement, one can expect
that a similarly small number of states will be eligible for USF funding.
Indeed, the Universal Service Administrative Company projects that in the
fourth quarter of 2003, the only states that will receive high-cost support
are Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.133
In most states, therefore, carriers are not even eligible to receive
federal nonrural USF funding. Thus, federal nonrural USF funding cannot
possibly make up for any disparities that such ILECs might experience.
As for the federal rural carrier USF, it distributes funds as follows:
First, the FCC looks at calculations of The FCC begins by calculating
embedded, historical costs averaged over so-called “study areas.”134
Carriers then receive support for a certain percentage of their loop costs,
“depending on the number of loops they serve and the degree to which their
costs exceed the national average cost per loop.”135 The growth in total
nationwide subsidization from year to year is limited to the percentage
growth in the number of working rural loops nationwide.136 Specifically, a
carrier will receive support only if its embedded loop costs for a study area
are more than 115% of the national average loop cost,137 which the FCC
estimates to be $240.138

132. Universal Serv. Fund, FCC, Estimated Annual Support Amounts Based on
Projections for 1st Quarter, 2002, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA01-2927A2.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
133. Universal Serv. Admin. Co., High Cost Support Projected by State – 4Q2003, at
http://universalservice.org/overview/filings/2003/Q4/HC02%20-%20High%20Cost%
20Support%20Projected%20by%20State%20-%204Q2003%20.xls (last visited Oct. 21,
2003).
134. Rural High-Cost Order, supra note 114, paras. 13, 25.
135. Id. para. 13 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 36.601 et seq.).
136. Id. paras. 31, 48.
137. Id. para. 54 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 36.601-36.631).
138. Id. para. 55. Support varies in percentage terms by the number of total loops served
by the carrier. Id. paras. 63, 63 n.167.
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In short, federal USF programs disburse funds only to carriers whose
costs are grossly in excess of the national average. The inevitable result of
this is that many carriers in many areas are not compensated in any
meaningful fashion for their service of high-cost areas. This is most amply
demonstrated by the fact that nonrural carriers in 42 states are ineligible for
federal high-cost support.
State systems of USF disbursement are generally no better. The Texas
USF system, established on January 14, 2000,139 is an exemplar of how
state USFs usually work in this regard. Texas calculates revenue
benchmarks for both residential and business customers.140 These
benchmarks are calculated by taking the yearly sum of revenues (statewide)
from local services and a reasonable portion of toll and access services, and
then dividing by the average number of lines served during that period.141
The Texas commission then uses a cost proxy model to determine the
forward-looking economic cost (“FLEC”) for each wire center.142 If the
forward-looking cost for a wire center is above the average statewide
revenue benchmark, the difference is termed the monthly per-line support
amount (“MPLS amount”). Every month, each carrier’s support amount is
therefore equal to the number of eligible lines in each high-cost wire center
multiplied by the MPLS amount for that wire center.143
Notably, the amount that any carrier can receive is automatically
reduced by any amount that the carrier receives from the federal USF
program.144 More damaging, though, is that whenever a carrier receives
disbursements from the Texas USF, it must make equal and commensurate
reductions in other rates, including switched access charges and intraLATA

139. See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Compliance Proceeding for Implementation of the
Texas High Cost Universal Service Plan, Docket No. 18515 (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter
Texas USF Order], available at http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/.
R.
26.403(e)(1)(B)
(2003),
available
at
140. See
P.U.C.
SUBST.
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26.403/26.403.pdf.
141. See Texas USF Order, supra note 139, at 97.
142. Id. at 92 (citing P.U.C. SUBST. R. 26.403(e)(1)(A)).
143. Id.. More complicated rules come into play when the carrier receiving USF support
has obtained facilities through the lease of UNEs from an ILEC. See, e.g., id. at 99-100; see
also Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Rulemaking to Amend USF Rules Regarding Unbundled
Network Element Sharing Mechanism, Project No. 24526 (2003), available at
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26.403/26.403.pdf.
144. Texas USF Order, supra note 139, at 99; P.U.C. SUBST. R. 26.403(e)(3)(B).
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toll rates.145 In the PUC’s words, “Without such reductions, companies
would receive a windfall by virtue of THCUSP implementation.”146
California’s Universal Service program is run in almost the same way.
California set up the California High Cost Fund-B (“CHCF-B”)147 to
reimburse local exchange companies for serving high-cost areas,148
determined by using a proxy cost model that shows which areas exceed the
statewide average cost of service.149 Just as in Texas, California announced,
“In order to avoid a windfall to the five large and mid-size LECs, any
subsidy support received from the CHCF-B shall be reduced by the same
amount through an equal percentage reduction for all services except for
basic service rates.”150
Similarly, in Colorado, the Commission requires that any “Eligible
Provider” who hopes to receive compensation from the high-cost fund shall
file “rates or prices that will lower its overall regulated revenues in an
amount equal to the sum of” support from the Colorado and federal
USFs.151
It is difficult to see just what benefit any carrier serving a high-cost
area could possibly receive from such a system. Such an ILEC will be
forced to contribute to the USF based on revenues collected there, and any
USF support it receives must be countered by a reduction in other rates.
The overall effect is a complete wash.
The California Commission did attempt to justify this restriction by
suggesting that if ILECs did not lower their other rates, they might, in
effect, be compensated twice for the cost of serving high-cost areas—once
145. Texas USF Order, supra note 139, at 55, 101; P.U.C. SUBST. R. 26.417(c)(2)(A),
available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26.417/26.417.pdf.
146. Texas USF Order, supra note 139, at 55, 101. Note also that any utility holding a
certificate of operating authority or a service provider certificate of operating authority “may
not charge a higher amount” for switched access than the “holder of the certificate of
convenience and necessity in whose territory the call originated or terminated.” TEX. UTIL.
CODE ANN. § 52.155(a) (Vernon 2003). Thus, if an ILEC is forced to lower its switched
access charges due to disbursements from the USF, other smaller rural providers may be
forced to match the ILEC’s switched access charges as well. This might provide an
incentive for them to ally with the ILEC in challenging this provision.
147. See Cal. USF Decision, supra note 122, at *4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *4.
CODE
REGS.
§
723-41-8.7.2
(2003),
available
at
151. 4
COLO.
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/rules/723-41.pdf.
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from the state USF support system, and once from higher-than-cost rates
imposed on other customers.152 In other words, the assumption seems to be
that ILECs will still be able, even in a competitive marketplace, to keep
charging rates (either for other services or to other customers) that are
higher than the cost structure would justify.
But this assumption makes no sense. Urban business customers have
often been relatively overcharged, for example, as a means of crosssubsidizing higher-cost service in other areas for other customers. In
today’s competitive marketplace, those are precisely the customers and
areas that the CLECs are targeting and will continue to target as long as
there is any gap between the historic rates and the costs of service. Thus,
given competition, the ILECs will, in short time, be unable to charge
higher-than-cost rates anyway. This means that there is little to no risk of
any windfall from giving unconditional compensation out of a universal
service fund.

IV. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM
The problem is simple: It is flatly incoherent for the state and federal
governments to use one set of regulations for wholesale prices (deaveraged
TELRIC rates) and a completely opposite set of regulations for retail prices
(averaged universal service rates).
Scholars generally agree that competition in the telecommunications
market is inconsistent with universal service obligations.153 As one scholar
noted:
The presence of competition in local telecommunications markets . . .
will eventually eliminate any cross-subsidies that governmental
authorities have built into the existing regulated rate structure, such as
the subsidization of residential customers by business customers. If
competitors are as efficient as the RBOCs, then the RBOC cannot set
the price for any service at a level above the stand-alone costs of

152. Cal. USF Decision, supra note 122, at *315 (“[I]n order to make subsidies for high
cost areas explicit, there must be a correlating downward adjustment of rates or price
caps . . . so as to prevent the LECs from recovering implicit subsidy support as well.”).
153. See, e.g., Frieden, supra note 91, at 404; Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating
Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 62 (1995) [hereinafter Spulber]; Rosston &
Wimmer, The ABC’s, supra note 90, at 1598-99; West, supra note 15, at 161.
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providing that service. If an RBOC attempted to do so, a competitor
could profitably enter that market and provide the service on a standalone basis or in conjunction with other services.154

As the FCC has observed, “The result of state requirements that local
telephone rates be averaged across the state is that high-density (urban)
areas, where costs are typically lower, subsidize low-density (rural)
areas.”155 Thus, the very concept of universal service requires that some
customers are being charged less than the actual costs of their service, and
the money that makes up the difference has to come from somewhere. If
that money does not come from federal or state USFs, the ILEC serving the
expensive customers must make up the difference. And if, because of the
competitive provisions of the 1996 Act, the ILEC is unable to charge
urban/business customers at historic retail rates, the money will come out
of the ILEC’s bottom line.156

154. Spulber, supra note 153, at 62. Even the Supreme Court has observed that the two
goals are in conflict:
Currently, state laws require local phone rates to include a “universal service”
subsidy. Business customers, for whom the cost of service is relatively low, are
charged significantly above cost to subsidize service to rural and residential
customers, for whom the cost of service is relatively high. Because this universalservice subsidy is built into retail rates, it is passed on to carriers who enter the
market through the resale provision. Carriers who purchase network elements at
cost, however, avoid the subsidy altogether and can lure business customers away
from incumbents by offering rates closer to cost. This, of course, would leave the
incumbents holding the bag for universal service.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 393 (1999). The Court went on to say that its
remand of the FCC’s unbundling rule “may render the incumbents’ concern on this score
academic.” Id. But as we now know, the FCC returned shortly thereafter with an unbundling
rule that, as the D.C. Circuit noted, was in several respects actually broader than the rule that
the Supreme Court found too broad. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415,
420-21 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Court also observed, in dicta, that because Section 254
“requires that universal-service subsidies be phased out,” the “possibility of arbitrage . . .
will be only temporary.” Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 393-94.
155. Report and Order, May 1997, supra note 96 para. 11. See also Rosston & Wimmer,
The ABC’s, supra note 90, at 1599 (noting that regulators “rel[y] on geographically
averaged rates to hold rates down in high-cost areas”).
156. Gasmi et al. observe that in modeling a competitive scenario where a CLEC
captures half the urban area and the incumbent serves the other half and the entire rural area,
“the incumbent has to match the entrant’s (average-cost) price in the urban area and apply
that same price in the rural area because of the obligation to offer service at affordable
prices. This implies a deficit. . . .” GASMI ET AL., COST PROXY MODELS, supra note 92, at 145
(emphasis added).
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In short, ILECs are being forced simultaneously to sell the UNE
platform
at
cut-rate,
cost-based,
hypothetically-most-efficient,
geographically-deaveraged prices to their competitors, while selling their
retail service to end-user customers at averaged, universal service prices
that in many areas cannot possibly cover the costs of service. As time
marches on, and CLECs cream-skim the low-cost urban markets, the
ILECs will be in an even more inequitable position—they will be left
serving the high-cost, unattractive customers but unable to make up the
difference by serving the low-cost customers as well. The problem will be
exacerbated in those states with value-of-service retail pricing, wherein
there is an even greater margin of profit (and hence a greater incentive) for
competitors to target urban businesses. And ILECs will still be forced to
contribute to federal USFs that provide little compensation in return, as
well as state USFs that may make disbursements only if the ILEC agrees to
reduce other charges. In every possible respect, the current system of rate
regulation and USF funding/distribution is unfair to the ILECs.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
A. Takings Clause Doctrines
The constitutional provision typically used to challenge rate setting is
the Takings Clause, which provides that “[private] property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.”157 The foundational
principle of the Takings Clause is that the government should not force
“some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”158

157. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). The
Takings Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, though there is some
confusion over whether that originally occurred through the Due Process Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause. Chicago, which relied on the Due Process Clause, is the case most
often cited as having incorporated the Takings Clause. See, e.g., First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987) (citing Chicago
for incorporation); see also Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 175 n.1 (1985) (also citing Chicago). In an 1894 case, however, the Court
opined that “The equal protection of the laws which, by the Fourteenth Amendment, no
State can deny to the individual, forbids legislation . . . by which the property of one
individual is, without compensation wrested from him for the benefit of another, or of the
public.” Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894).
158. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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As for the availability of relief under other constitutional provisions,
it is worth noting in passing that early takings cases relied not only on the
Takings Clause, but also on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.159 And the Fifth Circuit has held that a
deprivation of property may give rise to both a takings claim and a
substantive due process claim.160 Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that the
Takings Clause is the most appropriate doctrinal hook for modern takings
claims.161 As the First Circuit has noted in a case involving confiscatory
price caps on gasoline producers, “recent cases from the Supreme Court
seem to suggest a strong preference for a takings analysis in such a
situation.”162 Moreover, the Takings Clause is much more likely to provide
a winning claim than either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses,
both of which are rarely used to strike down economic legislation.163

159. See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 59293 (1896); St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1895); Reagan,
154 U.S. at 399; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458
(1890).
160. See John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 2000).
161. Moreover, if a lawsuit were filed in the Court of Federal Claims, no such claims
could be included anyway. As that court has said, “It is well settled, that [under the Tucker
Act, the Court of Federal Claims] . . . ‘has no jurisdiction over claims based upon the Due
Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, because these
constitutional provisions do not obligate the Federal Government to pay money damages.’”
Bellamy v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 720, 723 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (citations omitted);see also Clark
v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The courts have uniformly
held that jurisdiction under the ‘founded upon the constitution’ grant of the Tucker Act is
limited to claims under the ‘takings clause’ of the Fifth Amendment.”).
162. Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir. 1989);
see also id. at 1020 (“The constitutional requirement that rates be just and reasonable has
apparently moved from the protection of the due process clause to that of the takings
clause.”). As the Supreme Court held in a Fourth Amendment case, where the Constitution
“provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection . . . , that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Forseth v. Village of
Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 369 n.8 (7th Cir. 2000); Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County,
121 F.3d 610, 613-14 (11th Cir. 1997) (“‘[G]oes too far’ means so far that the regulation
constitutes a Takings Clause taking under one of the various standards set forth in recent
Supreme Court decisions, not a substantive due process violation.”); Armendariz v. Penman,
75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996).
163. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). In modern terms, the court
must ask if any conceivable set of facts has a rational relationship to the government’s
legitimate ends. See, e.g., In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70
(1968) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934)); Williamson v. Lee
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The Takings Clause, then, is the most appropriate home for a
constitutional challenge to the system of telecommunications pricing.164
The next choice is between the various subdoctrines that have arisen under
the Takings Clause.
First, there is the physical takings doctrine, which requires a showing
that some physical piece of property has been directly appropriated by the
government.165 To the extent that a takings claim included a challenge at
TELRIC, one might argue that the 1996 Act’s requirement of
“nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis,”166
amounted to a per se physical taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.167 Such a claim would find some precedent in the
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938). The Supreme Court has observed that takings claims receive higher scrutiny than
substantive due process or equal protection claims as to economic legislation. See Nollan v.
Calif. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987).
164. One might also argue for the inclusion of statutory claims as well. For example,
federal law requires that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in
connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable.” 47 U.S.C. §
201(b) (2000); see also 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (“[T]he Commission is authorized and
empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge.”); 47
U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (noting that the state commissions shall determine the “just and
reasonable rate for the interconnection of facilities and equipment”). Such a claim would
add little, however, to the constitutional claim. In construing statutes that require a
“reasonable rate,” the Court has noted that “the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not
confiscatory in the constitutional sense.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942). The Court has also held that the “just and reasonable standard of
the Natural Gas Act ‘coincides’ with the applicable constitutional standards.” Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 770 (1968). Assuming that the language in the Telecom
Act is interpreted like that of the Natural Gas Act, any statutory challenge would likely be
coterminous with the constitutional challenge. See Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254,
1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that “the critical determination in both matters is essentially
the same”); see also Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535,
1549 (1999) (“The statutory standard for setting ‘just and reasonable’ rates so closely tracks
the constitutional constraints against confiscatory ratemaking that the usual preference for
statutory over constitutional decisions poses no real barrier to a constitutional ruling on
TELRIC.”) (footnotes omitted).
165. Some have argued that the Takings Clause, as originally understood, applied only to
physical takings. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
167. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987)
(considering physical takings claim as to the Pole Attachment Act, which governs the terms
by which utility companies must allow cable companies to attach cables to their poles). In
Media Gen. Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F.
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D.C. Circuit’s reversals of the FCC’s collocation rules on statutory
grounds, the theory being that the court could thereby avoid construing the
rule as a violation of the physical takings doctrine.168 Furthermore, two
prominent scholars have recently argued that the physical takings doctrine
is the most appropriate home for a constitutional challenge to the 1996
Act’s requirements of interconnection and UNE access.169
Still, it is not clear how closely the claim would fit under the physical
takings doctrine. To the extent that the challenge is aimed at the retail rate
structure, it is not clear that one could plausibly allege a direct physical
taking at all. Second, even if the court were persuaded that a physical
taking had occurred, the real question would then become: Does the price
structure allowed to the ILECs amount to just compensation or not? The
Takings Clause, as the Supreme Court has said on many occasions, does
not prevent takings per se, but rather prevents takings without
compensation.170 To answer the question of compensation, one would
likely have to consult the confiscatory rate doctrine, which will be
discussed below.171

Supp. 903 (E.D. Va. 1990), the court distinguished Florida Power, saying that it does not
support the physical takings doctrine like Loretto does. Id. at 908.
168. E.g., GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 421, 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bell
Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also GTE N.W., Inc. v.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 900 P.2d 495, 504 (Or. 1995).
169. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 947-49, 960-70 (2003) [hereinafter
Spulber & Yoo].
170. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987).
171. Spulber and Yoo also argue persuasively and at great length that the bulk of the
Supreme Court’s precedents make clear that governmental takings must be compensated by
the full market value of the thing taken, that market value is becoming more readily
calculable in the telecommunications market, and that, therefore, market value should
replace the confiscatory rate doctrine to the extent feasible. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 169,
at 949-59, 970-80. But even if a court could readily calculate the market value for a wide
variety of telecommunications equipment and facilities, it is unclear that market value
would suffice to compensate the ILECs for the Takings problem that has been identified.
That is, the market value of UNEs, whatever that is, would not include any amount of
overcharging, as has been done in the past to cross-subsidize more expensive customers.
Thus, even if an ILEC is able to obtain the full market value for UNEs, that is no guarantee
that it will be fully compensated for universal service and carrier of last resort obligations.
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A second subdoctrine is the regulatory takings doctrine. This doctrine
arose in the 1922 decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,172 in which
Justice Holmes wrote for the Court that “while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”173 Although this case involved land use restrictions, the holding of
Mahon has been extended to numerous government restrictions on other
types of property.174 In 1978, the Court added a small bit of clarity to the
“too far” test by holding that three factors are of particular relevance: “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation” on the property owner, “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.”175
Finally, there is the confiscatory rate doctrine, which specifically
applies to claims that a regulated rate fails to compensate a public utility for
its expenses. Though the regulatory takings and confiscatory rate doctrines
differ more in name than in substance,176 the confiscatory rate doctrine is
likely to be the most apt doctrine on which to rest any takings claim. The

172. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
173. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) ( interest on attorney
trust accounts); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602 (1993) (pension plans); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (welfare
payments); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (pesticide formulas); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank,
459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (liens on real property); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (eagle
feathers); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) ( black lung benefits).
175. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
176. The Supreme Court has occasionally used the two lines of precedents
interchangeably. For example, in one rent control case, the Court looked to confiscatory rate
precedents, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1988), while in another rent
control case, the Court looked to its regulatory takings precedents, Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992). As two legal scholars have recently pointed out, a close
reading of Supreme Court opinions suggests:
[B]oth lines of precedent may represent a single concept. It is easy to
conceptualize a restriction on the amount that one can charge for access to a
piece of property as either a restriction on the property’s use or as a “public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.” Moreover, similar concerns appear to animate both lines of
precedent.
Spulber & Yoo, supra note 169, at 943-44; see also John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to
Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65,
98 (1985) (asserting that the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking
precedents are “equivalent”).
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regulatory takings label is more often applied to those situations in which
the government has, by regulation, either deprived a real property owner of
all economically viable use of his property or has compelled the owner to
surrender the right to exclude others from the use of his property.177 By
contrast, the confiscatory rate doctrine by definition relates to an unfair rate
structure, which would be precisely the ILEC’s complaint.

B. The Confiscatory Rate Doctrine—History and Current
Applications
The confiscatory rate doctrine arose in the late nineteenth century and
was based on the notion that, although the state can lawfully regulate prices
of public utilities,
it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself
without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and
limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of
regulating fares and freights, the State cannot require a railroad
corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it
do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation, or without due process of law.178

In the early years of the Court’s takings jurisprudence, the Court itself
took great pains to examine various pricing methodologies as used by
regulators.179 Thus, in the famous case of Smyth v. Ames,180 the Court held
that regulated entities deserved to receive the “fair value”181 of their
investment, and that the Court should look to the “original cost of
construction . . . , the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the
present as compared with the original cost of construction, [and] the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed
by statute.”182

177. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
178. R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
179. A survey of the history of rate regulation can be found in the Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 477-89 (2002).
180. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
181. Id. at 546.
182. Id. at 546-47; see also San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 442
(1903) (“‘what the company is entitled to demand, in order that it may have just
compensation, is a fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is
being used for the public’”) (quoting San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Nat’l City, 174 U.S.
739, 757 (1899)).
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Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
“fair value” inquiry, following a long line of separate opinions criticizing
that theory as uncertain and unworkable.183 Instead, the Court held that the
Takings Clause can be invoked only where the ultimate outcome is unfair.
“The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any
single formula or combination of formulas. . . . If the Commission’s order,
as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its entirety, produces no
arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.”184 In another case, the Court held
that “it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling.
It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total
effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.”185 The Court still maintains this view:
“[A]n otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitutional attack by
questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it.”186
Instead, the Court laid out the following observations on what a
regulated firm has a right to expect:
[T]he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial
integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the
investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough
revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of
the business. . . . [T]he return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to
maintain its credit and to attract capital.187

183. The change in theory was instigated by a famous dissent by Justice Brandeis in
1923, in which he argued that the Smyth v. Ames fair value rule “is delusive. In the attempt
to apply it insuperable obstacles have been encountered. It has failed to afford adequate
protection either to capital or to the public.” Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923); see also McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302
U.S. 419, 428-29 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing fair value); West v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689-90 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) (criticizing the fair
value rule); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S.
679, 695 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
184. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); see
also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
185. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (citations
omitted).
186. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989).
187. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603. The Court went on to hold: “Rates which
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Following Hope Natural Gas, the Court most recently opined in
Duquesne that “whether a particular rate is ‘unjust’ or ‘unreasonable’ will
depend to some extent on what is a fair rate of return given the risks under
a particular ratesetting system, and on the amount of capital upon which the
investors are entitled to earn that return.”188 In Duquesne, Pennsylvania had
calculated electric rates by looking primarily at the historical cost of the
property/capital in service.189 The state did, however, disallow the earning
of returns on investments that, although prudent at the time, were not “used
and useful.”190 The Court approved, holding “that a state scheme of utility
regulation does not ‘take’ property simply because it disallows recovery of
capital investments that are not ‘used and useful in service to the
public.’”191
It is difficult to pin down exactly what would constitute a taking under
the Court’s jurisprudence. The mere fact that one method of calculating
rates was approved in Duquesne does not tell us which of the many
possible alternative rates might be unconstitutional. The Court noted in
Duquesne that there had been no argument that “these slightly reduced
rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving
them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise
future capital.”192 But these vague suggestions do not establish just exactly
how much damage to financial integrity or to capital-raising ability would
count as a taking.

enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract
capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned
as invalid. . . .” Id. at 605. This standard was essentially set forth in prior cases as well. See,
e.g., Bluefield Water Works, 262 U.S. at 692 (1923) (“A public utility is entitled to such
rates as will permit it to earn a return . . . equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties . . . .”).
188. Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 310.
189. Id. at 312.
190. Id. Cf. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 53.051 (Vernon 1998) (“In establishing a public
utility’s rates, the commission shall establish the utility’s overall revenues at an amount that
will permit the utility a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable return on the utility’s
invested capital used and useful in providing service to the public in excess of the utility’s
reasonable and necessary operating expenses.”).
191. Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 301-02.
192. Id. at 312.
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On such questions, the Court has unfortunately provided little
guidance.193 Even in Hope Natural Gas, the Court said that it was not
“important to this case to determine the various permissible ways in which
any rate base on which the return is computed might be arrived at.”194 This
refusal to specify what makes a rate “reasonable” led Justice Jackson to
observe in his famous and devastating dissent:
If . . . we are to bring judgment of our own to the task, we should for
the guidance of the regulators and the regulated reveal something of
the philosophy, be it legal or economic or social, which guides us. We
need not be slaves to a formula but unless we can point out a rational
way of reaching our conclusions they can only be accepted as resting
on intuition or predilection. I must admit that I possess no instinct by
which to know the “reasonable” from the “unreasonable” in prices and
must seek some conscious design for decision.
The Court sustains this order as reasonable, but what makes it so or
what could possibly make it otherwise, I cannot learn.195

As Justice Scalia pointed out in a similar passage, “We cannot
determine whether the payments a utility has been allowed to collect
constitute a fair return on investment, and thus whether the government’s
action is confiscatory, unless we agree upon what the relevant ‘investment’
is.”196
The problem is that the Hope Natural Gas standard—looking only at
ultimate fairness and not at underlying methodology—is mostly incoherent.
In order to determine whether the final rate is fair or not, the court must
compare that final rate to some sort of benchmark, and in order to
determine the benchmark rate of return, the court simply must have some
idea of what methodology is constitutionally required. For example, if the
Constitution guarantees only that the firm can recover its hypothetically
most efficient forward-looking costs, then a rate that is accurately
calculated using that methodology will produce a fair ultimate outcome.
But if the benchmark for takings purposes is the historical cost experienced

193. See Sean P. Madden, Note, Takings Clause Analysis of Utility Ratemaking
Decisions: Measuring Hope’s Investor Interest Factor, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 436-37
(1989) (“Hope mandates end results that are ‘just and reasonable,’ but those terms are
difficult to define with precision. Moreover, Hope and its progeny provided few criteria by
which a reviewing court can judge the end result of a rate order.”) (footnotes omitted).
194. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603.
195. Id. at 645-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
196. Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 317 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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by the firm, then a rate based on forward-looking costs might produce an
unconstitutional taking. One simply cannot determine ultimate fairness
unless one has a definite point of comparison.
This, though, the Court has declined to do. To quote again from the
Court’s most recent leading case:
If the rate does not afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken
the use of utility property without paying just compensation and so
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As has been observed,
however, “[h]ow such compensation may be ascertained, and what are
the necessary elements in such an inquiry, will always be an
embarrassing question.”197

Moreover, the Court has often emphasized the fact-specific nature of a
takings inquiry.198 In more recent years, the Court has noted that takings
claims give rise to “ad hoc, factual inquiries.”199
Richard Pierce has noted that there are three main possibilities for
determining fair and constitutional rates: the prudent investment test, the
“used and useful” test, and the risk allocation method.200 Under the prudent
investment test, the court would hold confiscatory any rate that did not
allow the utility to recover the costs for capital and facilities investments
that were prudent at the time they were made. The “used and useful” test
would ask whether the rate fully recompenses the utility for its facilities
that are actually used and useful in its ongoing operations at the time the
rate is set.201 The third option is the risk allocation method, in which the
regulator or court attempts to allocate the risks of excess capacity or
discontinued facilities between utilities and their consumers.202
Pierce argues that we should consider the institutional capabilities of
the judiciary when considering what test to apply here.203 He is skeptical of
197. Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
198. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262
U.S. 679, 692 (1923) (“What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends upon
many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of a fair and enlightened
judgment, having regard to all relevant facts.”); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v.
Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (“In short, each case must depend upon its special
facts. . . .”).
199. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
200. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary
Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2049-50 (1989).
201. Id. at 2055.
202. Id. at 2056.
203. Id. at 2042-47. Cf. generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
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any court’s capability to inquire into matters of risk allocation204 or of the
firm’s ability to attract capital on the market.205 As for the prudent
investment test, “predicting disallowances based on imprudence requires
the services of an omniscient political scientist.”206
Although the question of judicial capacity is not easy to answer, one
suspects that the “used and useful” test might be easiest for judges to

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (arguing for wider
consideration of institutional capabilities).
204. “The likelihood that reviewing courts will develop a mastery of risk allocation and
constrain the process of risk allocation in a tolerably consistent manner seems slight.”
Pierce, supra note 200, at 2065-66.
205. Id. at 2061-64. Pierce also states:
It is even less likely that courts would be able to administer this form of strong
review with tolerable error and resource costs. Every agency decision would turn
on specific findings with respect to elusive facts, such as the impact on a firm’s
future financial condition of an agency’s disallowance of all or part of an
investment. Most cases also would involve controversial and conflicting
interjurisdictional judgments. Reviewing courts would have to engage in detailed
review of multiple findings and then decide the proportionate burden of regulatory
relief that should be borne by consumers in each jurisdiction.
The results of this process of review would include wide variations attributable
to the differing attitudes of liberal and conservative judges. Moreover, many cases
would create intractable parochial conflicts between courts of different states.
Even if the Supreme Court decided to devote a high proportion of its resources to
managing this form of judicial participation in the ratemaking process, it could
decide only a small fraction of the many cases announcing inconsistent allocation
rules or applying the fact-specific financial impairment test to identical
circumstances with different results. Thus, by any standard—substantive effect,
resource costs, or error costs—qualifying the used and useful test by applying a
strong version of the end result test would be a costly mistake.
Id. at 2064 (footnotes omitted).
206. Id. at 2070. Pierce points to highly disparate results in quite similar cases where
judges attempted to inquire into the prudence of prior investments. Id. at 2066-69. He
concludes:
[P]rudence determinations are so dependent on subjective assessments of
complicated, ambiguous patterns of conduct that any judicial effort to control the
ratemaking process through strict scrutiny of prudence findings would likely entail
very high error and resource costs. The deferential substantial evidence test which
is applied to all other agency findings would have to be replaced with something
that gives reviewing courts far more control over the factfinding process in
prudence cases. The only possibility that comes to mind is rejuvenating the old
“constitutional fact” doctrine that once required de novo review of all findings
with constitutional implications. This would impose a massive burden on scarce
judicial resources.
Id. at 2069 (footnotes omitted). But see Madden, supra note 193, at 436-37 (arguing that
courts should use the prudent investment test as a constitutional matter).
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implement, as it would merely require the parties to demonstrate whether
particular investments were being used to provide local exchange service or
not. On the other hand, perhaps the most easily implemented test would be
to consider any and all physical facilities owned by the ILECs at present.
The obvious objection is that ILECs may have many physical facilities that
are either unused or were not a prudent investment at the time it was
incurred. But this objection bears less weight in an era when prominent
ILECs are subject to price-cap regulation, which provides enormous
incentives for ILECs (at least over short-term periods before rates are
ultimately adjusted) to construct and deploy facilities in the most efficient
manner possible (so as to pocket the additional profits allowable under the
cap).207 In other words, the existence of price-cap regulation may enable
courts to avoid difficult and intransigent inquiries into the prudence of
investments, etc., by employing a heuristic assumption that current ILEC
facilities were constructed and deployed with something close to maximum
efficiency.
As noted above, the Hope Natural Gas Court said that “the return to
the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in
other enterprises having corresponding risks.”208 As interpreted by Baumol
and Merrill, this inquiry
entails determining (1) the risk of the regulated enterprise; (2) the
competitive rate of return available in capital markets on other
investments having comparable risks; (3) a projection of the total effect
of the rate order on the actual rate of return of the regulated enterprise;
and (4) a determination of whether the projected rate of return deviates
materially from the competitively required rate of return.209

Baumol and Merrill then suggest that the appropriate benchmark of
allowable investment be “whatever the regulatory jurisdiction itself deems
to be the proper rate base.”210
Adopting the regulatory jurisdiction’s benchmark, however, places an
enormous thumb on the scale on the side of not finding any takings
violations. In any event, there is an element of circularity in this measure of
207. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002) (describing the
incentives created by price-cap regulation).
208. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
209. William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037,
1043-44 (1997) [hereinafter Baumol & Merrill].
210. Id. at 1044.
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fairness, since the ILEC’s level of risk will no doubt be closely correlated
to the possibility that regulators will not set rates at a fair level and that
courts will fail to recognize a confiscatory taking. Put another way, part of
the risk faced by ILECs is precisely that regulators have set in place a selfcontradictory set of pricing systems and that courts might not rule in their
favor on the takings issue.
Alternatively, Hope Natural Gas might be interpreted to mean that
the court should consider the return available to the firm’s stockholders, but
it is difficult to see how this makes any sense. The attraction of this sort of
test is that it would avoid the following difficult issues: (1) what rate base
to look at, and (2) whether to examine historical or replacement value. This
test might also be easier for judges to implement with limited time and
capacity. On the other hand, to the extent that risk and market returns are
already highly correlated, as implied by the predominant Capital Asset
Pricing Model (“CAP-M”),211 then one would naturally expect to find that
any ILEC with a given level of risk (“beta,” in stock market lingo) would
experience, on average, a similar return compared to other stocks with the
same beta. It would be anomalous to find that ILECs incurred lower equity
returns than other firms with similar levels of risk; such a finding would be
an indication that the level of risk attributed to ILECs had been
underestimated. Thus, the stock market return measure seems problematic.
Whatever the methodology, it is clear that if a rate structure actually
causes the enterprise to lose money on an ongoing basis, a takings violation
has occurred. In the famous case, Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n,
Louisiana attempted to require a lumber company to operate a rural railroad
route, as part of its larger service operation, even though serving that route
would cause the railroad division a loss of more than $1500 per month.212
Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, held “The plaintiff
may be making money from its sawmill and lumber business but it no more
can be compelled to spend that than it can be compelled to spend any other
money to maintain a railroad for the benefit of others who do not care to
pay for it.”213
211. The CAP-M was developed in John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 13 (1965); and William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
212. 251 U.S. 396, 397 (1920).
213. Id. at 399. The Court went on: “The principle is illustrated by the many cases in
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This is relevant because many (if not all) ILECs are designated as
“carriers of last resort” under various state laws, which means that they are
generally not allowed to (1) refuse local phone service to any customer in
any area in which they operate, or (2) discontinue service in an area where
there is no other carrier.214 As the Court observed over 100 years ago, the
Constitution forbids the legislature to “compel parties engaged in legitimate
business, and business which cannot be abandoned at will, to so reduce
their charges for service as to make the carrying on of that business result
in a continued loss.”215 At least two reported federal decisions have
approved a state commission’s refusal to order geographic deaveraging as
to UNE rates, on the grounds that carrier of last resort obligations would
leave ILECs in an unfair position.216 These carrier of last resort obligations
which the constitutionality of a rate is shown to depend upon whether it yields to the parties
concerned a fair return.” Id.
214. See, e.g., TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 54.251(a) (Vernon 1998) (requiring the holder of
a certificate of convenience and necessity or a certificate of operating authority to “offer all
basic local telecommunications services to each customer in the utility’s certificated area;
and provide continuous and adequate service in that area”); Id. § 54.253(d) (providing that a
holder of a certificate of operating authority may not cease operations unless there is another
provider serving the area); Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, Rulemaking on the Commission’s
Own Motion into Universal Service and to Comply with the Mandates of Assembly Bill
3643, Decision No. 96-10-066, 1996 Cal. PUC LEXIS 1046, at **292-93 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(discussing California’s carrier of last resort obligations).
215. Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 409 (1894). The Court
considered a similar argument in the Permian case:
The producers have urged, and certain of this Court’s decisions might be
understood to have suggested, that if maximum rates are jointly determined for a
group or area, the members of the regulated class must, under the Constitution, be
proffered opportunities either to withdraw from the regulated acitivity or to seek
special relief from the group rates. . . .
It is enough for present purposes that the Commission has in other
circumstances allowed abandonment, and that it has indicated that it will, in
appropriate cases, authorize it here.
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1968) (emphasis added).
216. AT&T Comm. of the Pac. N.W., Inc. v. U.S. West Comm., Inc., 31 F. Supp.2d 861,
865 (D. Or. 1998) (“Under present rules, U.S. West must charge the same retail rate for
service, regardless of how much it costs to serve a particular customer. In addition, U.S.
West is required to provide service to anyone in its service area who requests it, whereas
competitors such as AT&T can solicit the most profitable customers while leaving the
remainder for U.S. West to serve.”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. GTE N.W., Inc., 41 F.
Supp.2d 1157, 1171 (D. Or. 1999) (“an ILEC is legally obligated to service all customers
within its territory, at the same fixed price. Consequently, MCI and other CLECs could
solicit the most profitable customers, leaving the ILEC to service the unprofitable accounts
the CLECs do not want.”). Note that in a recent Fifth Circuit case in which GTE challenged
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should, therefore, lend support to the theory that ILECs may be
experiencing a taking.
One might expect the FCC and state commissions (not to mention the
CLECs) to be highly resistant to the takings claim I have outlined. Their
argument in response would probably proceed as follows: An ILEC may
have experienced lower than usual rates of return on its investments
(however calculated), but that does not mean that federal or state rate
regulation is the cause. The telecom market is in trouble generally, and on
top of that, the ILECs are experiencing the pressure of increasing
competition. In fact, as the ILECs’ traditional monopoly is eroded by
competition, one should expect that their rate of return will decrease.
To be able to respond to that counterargument, a plaintiff ILEC will
find it crucial to present hard figures on the actual costs of service, the
effects of state-mandated retail rates, the effects of UNE rates, and figures
from state and federal universal service funds.217 Only such an evidentiary
showing would suffice to clearly establish the harmful impact of the current
structure.218 The plaintiff ILEC would also be wise to procure

the FCC’s first universal service order, the FCC itself argued that “GTE’s problems stem
not from bundling but from state-imposed ‘carrier of last resort’ (“COLR”) requirements,
which prohibit [ILECs] such as GTE from disconnecting low-profit consumers and leave
[ILECs] vulnerable to outside competition.” Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393, 420 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit took a dim view of this argument from the
FCC, noting that eliminating COLR requirements would undermine universal service. But
this poses no barrier to an ILEC presenting the argument that COLR requirements
exacerbate the difficulties that ILECs face in a competitive marketplace.
217. Hard-and-fast numbers would be necessary to avoid dismissal on ripeness grounds,
the fate that has befallen almost all takings challenges related to TELRIC or universal
service under the 1996 Act. See, e.g., Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 167980 (2002); Alenco Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 624 (5th Cir. 2000); Iowa Utilities
Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 754 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, Verizon, 122 S. Ct.
1646; Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1999); Iowa
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d & remanded in part on other
grounds, sub nom AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); U.S. West Comm.,
Inc. v. Garvey, No. Civ. 97-913 ADM/ALB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042, at *107 (D.
Minn. Mar. 30, 1999); GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 530 (E.D. Va. 1998);
MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc. v. GTE N.W., Inc., Nos. C97-742WD, C97905WD, C97-928WD,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11335, at **18-19 (W.D. Wash. Jul 7, 1998);
S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Comm. of the Southwest, Inc., No. A 97-CA-132 SS, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15637, at **39-44 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998).
218. Cf. Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that
there was no taking involved in the FCC’s decision to allocate twenty-five percent of
nontraffic sensitive costs to interstate carriers; carriers had not shown any facts
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econometricians who could testify to the causal relationship between the
current regulatory structure and any economic problems that an ILEC has
experienced.
In so doing, it would not be enough for an ILEC to argue that its
business operations have become less profitable than those of its
competitors. As the Court said in a famous ratemaking case, “No
constitutional objection arises from the imposition of maximum prices
merely because ‘high cost operators may be more seriously affected . . .
than others.’”219 Nor would it be sufficient to show that the “fixing of
prices . . . may reduce the value of the property which is being
regulated.”220 “All that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that
the rates . . . be higher than a confiscatory level.”221 Thus, the ILEC must
show an actual unfair result from the combination of cost-based UNE rates,
universal service obligations, and a changing customer base.
An additional wrinkle is the old case of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co. v. United States,222 in which the Court held that “[s]o long as a railroad
is not caused by such [rate] regulations to lose money on its over-all
business, it is hard to think that it could successfully charge that its
property was being taken for public use ‘without just compensation.’”223
This case seems to be an outlier, however, and no other precedent suggests
that a confiscatory rate is constitutional as long as the business in question
demonstrating a confiscation); Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note 73, at 267-68 (arguing that
ILECs’ rate of return on regulated investment is high enough not to be a taking).
219. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 769 (quoting Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944)).
220. Fed. Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). In one
early case, the Court noted that the mere failure to produce a profit did not necessarily make
a rate confiscatory, because
there may have been extravagance and a needless expenditure of money; there
may be waste in the management . . . The construction may have been at a time
when material and labor were at the highest price, so that the actual cost far
exceeds the present value; the road may have been unwisely built, in localities
where there is no sufficient business to sustain a road.
Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 412 (1894).
221. Fed. Power Comm. v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
222. 345 U.S. 146 (1953).
223. Id. at 148. The Court went on to say, “And so long as rates as a whole afford
railroads just compensation for their over-all services to the public the Due Process Clause
should not be construed as a bar to the fixing of noncompensatory rates for carrying some
commodities when the public interest is thereby served.” Id. at 150.
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manages to make up the loss from other operations.224 Such a rule would
make no sense in today’s world of integrated business operations. Indeed,
modern courts do not follow the above principle, as is shown by a recent
case in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Michigan
law that froze regulated telephone rates for three years.225 After holding
that the price freeze was confiscatory, the court noted that “although the
plaintiffs have other unregulated income streams, they are not required to
subsidize their regulated services with income from rates either deemed to
be competitive, or with revenues generated from unregulated services.”226

C. Recent Developments
This section analyzes several recent circuit court cases involving
confiscatory rate claims.
In perhaps the most sophisticated application of modern takings
doctrine to a telecommunications carrier, the D.C. Circuit addressed a
challenge to the FCC’s rate base calculation for interstate services.227 The
FCC had determined BOC revenue requirements by using an equation: (I x
r) + C = R, where I is the rate base, r is the rate of return, C is operating
costs, and R is the total revenue.228 Much of the controversy focused on the
rate of return, which the FCC had calculated by using discounted cash flow
methodology.229 Though the D.C. Circuit ultimately held for the FCC, it
considered a range of factors under the Hope Natural Gas standard,
including the lack of “any steep decline in share prices,”230 and the fact that
224. Baumol and Merrill argue that any proper takings analysis should consider the fact
that the 1996 Act allowed the regional Bell companies, subject to certain restrictions, to
enter the long distance market. Baumol & Merrill, supra note 209, at 1060. They say:
If the same statute that takes away local revenues with one hand returns new
interstate revenues with the other, it makes no sense to slice up the same asset
(the LEC’s network) into different jurisdictional components and then declare a
taking in the part that is losing revenue while ignoring the other side of the
equation.
Id. at 1060-61.
225. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
226. Id. at 594 (citations omitted); see also Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508,
512 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating an insurance rate law that failed “to guarantee a
constitutionally required fair and reasonable return”).
227. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
228. Id. at 1258.
229. Id. at 1259.
230. Id. at 1261.
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the FCC had considered “evidence of the rate of returns for other
companies,” i.e., to other companies similarly ranked within the S&P
400.231 There was also a challenge to the FCC’s use of the “used and
useful” rule in calculating the rate base.232 Again, the D.C. Circuit found
for the FCC, because there had simply “been no demonstration that the
FCC’s rate base policy threatens the financial integrity of [plaintiffs] or
otherwise impedes their ability to attract capital.”233
In a 1990 case, the Ninth Circuit considered a Nevada law that rolled
back automobile insurance rates to a level fifteen percent below the July 1,
1988 levels, and froze rates at that point until October 1, 1990.234 The
insurance companies sued in federal district court, claiming that this law
“violate[d] due process requirements because it prohibit[ed] rate relief to
avoid confiscatory results,” and that it “‘would [have] deprive[d] each of
the plaintiffs of property and other rights in violation of the due process and
taking clauses.’”235
Nevada argued that one of its insurance statutes provided a sufficient
guarantee that the rates would be high enough to meet the Constitution’s
requirements. The statute specifically said that “‘[r]ates must not be
excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.’”236 The term
“inadequate,” in turn, was defined as follows: “‘[r]ates are inadequate if
they are clearly insufficient, together with the income from investments
attributable to them, to sustain projected losses and expenses in the class of
business of which they apply.’”237 Nevada thus argued that because it
statutorily guaranteed that insurance rates would be “adequate” in the sense
of covering all losses and expenses, the rates were therefore
constitutional.238
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying that this Nevada law “guarantees
only that an insurer will break even; it does not guarantee the
constitutionally required ‘fair and reasonable return.’”239 In other words,
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 510 (quoting the complaint from the insurance companies).
Id. at 515 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. 686B.050(1) (1987)).
Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. 686B.050(3) (1987)).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the Constitution guarantees a fair return to investors, not merely that the
enterprise will break even and be able to cover its costs. The court therefore
enjoined the implementation of the statute.240
More recently, the Sixth Circuit considered a Michigan law freezing
regulated telephone rates at their May 1, 2000 level until the end of 2003.241
The court noted that the Constitution protects against confiscatory rates
(though, the court focused on the Due Process Clause as opposed to the
Takings Clause).242 Like Nevada, Michigan attempted to argue that various
statutes guaranteed a return sufficient to meet the Constitution’s standard.
Specifically, Michigan pointed to statutes providing that “the rates for basic
local exchange service shall be just and reasonable,” and defining
“reasonable rate” as “a rate that is not inadequate. . . . A rate is inadequate
if it is less than the total service long run incremental cost of providing the
service [TSLRIC].”243
The court’s response was that the Constitution guarantees more than
the recovery of TSLRIC: “The definition [of ‘adequate’] clearly does not
guarantee a constitutionally adequate rate of return for regulated telephone
service providers because it merely permits telephone service providers to
cover costs, and does not ensure a fair and reasonable rate of return on
investment.”244 The court further discussed the definition of TSLRIC in the
Michigan statute, and concluded that under that definition, “a rate would
only be inadequate if it was set below the cost incurred by the service
provider. This clearly does not satisfy the constitutional standard . . .
because it merely ensures cost recovery without guaranteeing a fair and
reasonable rate of return on investment.”245 Based on these considerations,
the court affirmed the district court’s injunction against the statute.246
The Fifth Circuit, in 1999, heard a massive set of challenges to
various features of the federal universal service programs.247 Three of the
challenges involved takings claims. The first takings claim, brought by
GTE and Southwestern Bell, was that the federal USF failed to provide
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 516.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594 (quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 600.
Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999).
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enough support for high-cost areas because its support was based not on the
difference between revenue and actual costs, but on the difference between
revenue and the “forward-looking cost models based on the ‘least cost,
most efficient’ carrier.”248 The court disposed of the takings analysis in a
footnote that read:
GTE claims that implementing the forward-looking cost methodology
will force [ILECs] to operate at a loss, and this constitutes an
unconstitutional taking under Brooks-Scanlon. GTE’s claim has no
merit; it has not shown that a taking has occurred or that any taking
will be permanent or would be so serious as to be considered
“confiscatory.” . . .
Unlike the situation in Brooks-Scanlon, the circumstance here is that
the regulatory entity setting the rules, the FCC, is not requiring the
[ILECs] to remain open or to charge low rates, thereby forcing them to
operate at a permanent loss.249

Another entity—Celpage, a paging carrier—challenged an FCC
requirement that commercial mobile radio services contribute to the federal
USF.250 The court swiftly rejected the takings portion of this claim as not
ripe because Celpage had not used any of the FCC’s administrative
procedures for seeking compensation.251 The court also noted that Celpage
had failed to demonstrate a taking under the Supreme Court’s three-part
test for regulatory takings (i.e., the economic impact on the claimant, the
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action).252 The court did not explain its choice to refer to the
regulatory takings analysis here rather than the confiscatory rate doctrine.
The third takings claim was also by GTE and was aimed at the FCC’s
decision in that particular order to delay implementation of the federal USF
support program until January 1, 2000.253 GTE claimed “that the FCC’s
decision to leave [ILECs] exposed to local competition without first
implementing the new universal service plan results in a severe reduction
of its revenues from local service.”254 The court rejected this claim,

248. Id. at 410-11 (footnotes omitted).
249. Id. at 413 n.14 (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 426.
251. Id. at 428-29.
252. Id. at 429 n.59 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225
(1986)).
253. Id. at 435.
254. Id. at 437.

BUCK--FINAL FINAL FINAL

Number 1]

12/22/2003 6:48 AM

TELRIC VS. UNIVERSAL SERVICE

53

however, on the grounds that GTE “failed to meet the requirements of
Duquesne, because it cannot show that it will lose any revenue at all, much
less enough to constitute a taking under more recent precedent.”255 The
court continued, saying that “GTE’s reliance on Brooks-Scanlon is
misplaced, because we will not apply the rule in that case to transitional or
temporary periods.”256
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit in 2002 considered a takings claim
related to the 1996 Act’s amendments of the Pole Attachment Act, which
requires power companies to lease space on utility poles to cable television
companies.257 The court began the takings analysis by noting that because
Congress had mandated physical access to the utility poles, the
“confiscatory rate” doctrine was not to be applied. Rather, “a different
analytical hat must be worn”: that of the physical takings doctrine.258
Having concluded that a per se physical taking was present, the court
quickly moved to the question of just compensation,259 saying that it would
address whether marginal cost satisfied the Constitution’s requirements.260
As to this question, the court reasoned that where the available pole
space is sufficiently large to be practically nonrivalrous, marginal cost
should suffice to compensate the pole owner.261 The court concluded:
In short, before a power company can seek compensation above
marginal cost, it must show with regard to each pole that (1) the pole is
at full capacity and (2) either (a) another buyer of the space is waiting
in the wings or (b) the power company is able to put the space to a
higher-valued use with its own operations.262

Unless those factors are shown, said the court, “there is no ‘lost
opportunity’ foreclosed by the government.”263
In sum, the general disarray of the caselaw is notable. Courts have not
settled on a definite and precise means of determining what constitutes a
confiscatory rate. When the law at issue allows only the recovery of

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
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forward-looking costs, with no element of profit, courts do find that the rate
is confiscatory, as was the case in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v.
Engler264and Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Gates.265 But when the
rate is not as patently Spartan as in those cases, courts are more reluctant to
find any confiscatory takings in the absence of hard, concrete evidence
showing the actual effect on the firm’s revenues.

VI. CONCLUSION
Local phone companies are trapped between two utterly contrary
pricing schemes—the averaged retail rate system by which they are
obligated to serve all customers at roughly equal rates, and the wholesale
system by which they are obligated to sell access to their competitors at
hypothetical measures of cost. The contradiction between these two pricing
systems could easily produce a “confiscatory rate” in violation of the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.

264. 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
265. 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990).

